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FREE RIDING ON BENEVOLENCE: 
COLLECTIVE ACTION FEDERALISM 
AND THE MINIMUM COVERAGE 
PROVISION 
NEIL S. SIEGEL* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)1 requires most 
lawful residents of the United States to maintain a certain level of health 
insurance coverage (the minimum coverage provision) or pay a certain amount 
of money each year (the shared responsibility payment).2 These provisions go 
into effect on January 1, 2014. Present litigation over the ACA focuses 
primarily on the constitutionality of these provisions, which are popularly called 
the “individual mandate” by critics.3 Those attacking the minimum coverage 
provision argue, among other things, that it is beyond the scope of Congress’s 
power to regulate interstate commerce because it regulates inactivity (declining 
to obtain health insurance), as opposed to economic activity. To date, one 
federal court of appeals (out of three that have decided the merits of the 
question),4 as well as three federal district courts (out of six that have decided 
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 1.  Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (to be codified primarily in scattered 
sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 2.  The ACA labels this payment a “penalty.” ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501(b), 124 Stat. 119, 
244 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A).  
 3.  For ease of exposition, this article will now use the term “minimum coverage provision” to 
refer collectively to the minimum coverage provision and the shared responsibility payment. 
 4.  Compare Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (upholding minimum coverage 
provision as within the scope of Congress’s enumerated powers), and Thomas More Law Ctr. v. 
Obama, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011) (same), with Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t Health & 
Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011) (invalidating minimum coverage provision as beyond the 
scope of Congress’s enumerated powers).  
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the merits of the question),5 have invalidated the minimum coverage provision 
in part on the ground that it regulates inactivity.6 
The subject matter regulated by the minimum coverage provision can be 
characterized as health insurance markets. This characterization makes the 
provision appear to regulate inactivity (not obtaining health insurance). The 
provision requires individuals either to enter into an insurance contract or to 
pay money to the federal government each year if they do not. Critics of the 
provision prefer this characterization. 
Alternatively, the subject matter regulated by the minimum coverage 
provision can be characterized as the interstate healthcare market. Almost all 
Americans participate in this market in some fashion, and everyone has access 
to it regardless of ability to pay in the event of an emergency.7 Each year, 
uninsured Americans in this market obtain more than $50 billion worth of 
medical services for which other individuals and institutions must pay.8 This 
characterization makes the minimum coverage provision appear to regulate the 
activities of delivering and receiving healthcare. Defenders of the provision 
prefer this characterization.9 
This distinction between inactivity and activity, however, has nothing to do 
with the limits of congressional power granted in the clauses of Article I, 
Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution. Instead, as Robert Cooter and I have 
articulated, the presence or absence of multi-state collective action problems is 
central to understanding the scope of federal power in the clauses of Section 8.10 
 
 5.  Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 1:10–CV–763, 2011 WL 
4072875 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2011); Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 780 F. 
Supp. 2d 1256 (N.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Florida ex rel. Att’y. Gen. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 
728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010), vacated and remanded for lack of standing, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 
2011). 
 6.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled for the federal government 
on jurisdictional grounds. See Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, No. 10–2347, 2011 WL 3962915 (4th Cir. 
Sept. 8, 2011) (holding that the federal tax Anti-Injunction Act (TAIA) bars the action); Virginia ex rel. 
Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that Virginia lacks Article III standing to 
bring the action). Other courts have disagreed with the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion that the TAIA bars 
pre-enforcement challenges to the minimum coverage provision. The Supreme Court’s view of the 
question will determine whether it reaches the merits. For an argument that the TAIA does not bar the 
present challenges to the minimum coverage provision regardless of whether the ACA exaction for 
non-insurance is deemed a TAIA “tax,” see generally Michael C. Dorf & Neil S. Siegel, “Early-Bird 
Special” Indeed!: Why the Tax Anti-Injunction Act Permits the Present Challenges to the Minimum 
Coverage Provision, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 389 (2012), http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/1042.pdf. 
 7.  See infra notes 175, 176, 177, and accompanying text (discussing federal and state laws 
guaranteeing emergency access and longstanding charitable practices of hospitals). 
 8.  See Brief Amici Curiae of the American Hospital Association et al. in Support of Defendant-
Appellant and Reversal at 14, Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011) (Nos. 11-1057 & 11-1058), 2011 WL 
792216 (reporting that the uninsured received $56 billion in uncompensated care in 2008).  
 9.  See, e.g., Brief for Appellant, Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011) (Nos. 11-1057 & 11-1058), 
2011 WL 686279. 
 10.  See Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of 
Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115 (2010). For a similar approach to the commerce power, see 
generally Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2010). 
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These clauses mostly concern collective action problems created by interstate 
externalities and interstate markets.11 A prominent example is the Commerce 
Clause, which empowers Congress to regulate commerce “among the several 
States” but not commerce that is internal to a state.12 The theory of collective 
action federalism distinguishes activities that pose collective action problems for 
the states from those that do not. 
This structural account of Article I, Section 8 draws substantial support from 
constitutional text, history, and much judicial precedent.13 For example, the 
Framers understood collective action problems well; indeed, the pervasiveness 
of such problems among the states during the Critical Period of the 1780s 
inspired the Constitutional Convention.14 This structural approach also flows 
directly from the relative advantages of the federal and state governments. 
Much of what the federal government does better than the states is solve 
collective action problems that the states cannot deal with effectively on their 
own. According to the theory of collective action federalism, the expanse and 
limits of congressional power in the clauses of Section 8 turn in significant part 
on the difference between individual and collective action by states. 
In order to address multi-state collective action problems, the Constitution 
has long been understood to authorize Congress to mandate numerous kinds of 
private action. Examples include, but are not limited to, federal requirements to 
file a tax return,15 respond to the census and do so truthfully,16 report for jury 
duty,17 register for selective service,18 purchase firearms and gear in anticipation 
of service in the Militia,19 turn gold currency in to the government in exchange 
for paper currency,20 and surrender one’s property to the federal government 
when it exercises the power of eminent domain pursuant to its use of the 
Commerce Clause.21 
The distinction between individual and collective action by states is an 
appropriate place to look for limits on the commerce power. The distinction 
between inactivity and activity is not. Like other formal distinctions that have 
been introduced throughout American history to restrict the Commerce 
Clause,22 the inactivity–activity distinction is arbitrary in a critical sense: It does 
 
 11.  See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 10, at 144–50. 
 12.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  
 13.  See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 10, at 121–24, 144–51, 155–57, 159–80. 
 14.  Id. at 121–24. 
 15.  26 U.S.C. § 6012 (2006) (requiring all individuals, except those with very low incomes, to file a 
tax return).  
 16.  13 U.S.C. § 221(a)–(b).  
 17.  28 U.S.C. § 1866(g). 
 18.  50 U.S.C. app. § 453. 
 19.  See infra note 140 and accompanying text (discussing the Militia Act of 1792). 
 20.  Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317, 328 (1935). 
 21.  For discussion of this example and others, see infra Part IV.D. 
 22.  See, e.g., Cooter & Siegel, supra note 10, at 118 (“The crisis of the Great Depression ultimately 
exploded the Lochner Court’s categorical differentiations between ‘manufacturing’ and ‘commerce,’ 
‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ effects on commerce, goods in the ‘flow’ of commerce and goods not in the ‘flow,’ 
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not speak to the question of why we have a federal government to begin with—
it is unresponsive to the question of what the federal government can 
accomplish better than the states can accomplish by acting on their own. 
With respect to the Commerce Clause in particular, two things must be true 
for federal legislation to fall within its scope. First, the object of congressional 
regulation must be fairly describable as “economic” in nature. This is a 
requirement of current law.23 Second, Congress must have a reasonable basis to 
believe it is ameliorating a significant problem of collective action that exists 
“among the several States.”24 This is an interpretation and justification of 
current law. If Congress has no reasonable basis to believe it is helping to solve 
a significant collective action problem involving multiple states, then Congress 
may not invoke its commerce power.25 
Accordingly, whether Congress is mandating private action is irrelevant to 
the Commerce Clause inquiry. Congress can mandate private action using its 
commerce power, just as it can otherwise regulate private action using its 
commerce power, in order to address an economic problem of collective action 
among the states—when the states are “separately incompetent,” in the 
language of the Constitutional Convention,26 to solve the problem on their own 
because the scope of the problem disrespects state borders. The states are 
“separately incompetent” when they impose significant costs on one another 
without paying for them.27 
The decision whether to obtain health insurance coverage is economic in 
nature. It is a decision about how to manage substantial financial risk. The 
economic character of this decision is illustrated by the close analogy to the 
 
and ‘harmful’ and ‘harmless’ goods in commerce.”) (footnote omitted). 
 23.  See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). For a discussion of the governing doctrine, see infra Part 
IV.C.–D. 
 24.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  
 25.  A key question for a collective action analysis of federal legislation is the level of judicial 
scrutiny and thus the degree of judicial deference to congressional judgments about reasonableness. In 
light of empirical uncertainties, many federal laws would flunk heightened scrutiny. Reasonableness, 
however, is the appropriate test. Heightened scrutiny in Commerce Clause cases is unheard of in the 
Court’s contemporary federalism jurisprudence. See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 
564 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J., concurring in part and delivering the opinion of the court in part) (“The 
courts do not apply strict scrutiny to commerce clause legislation and require only an ‘appropriate’ or 
‘reasonable’ ‘fit’ between means and ends.”) (quoting United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956–
57 (2010)). 
 26.  For a discussion, see infra note 99 and accompanying text. 
 27.  As Part V makes clear, the phrase “separately incompetent” is a term of art that is best 
understood in light of the historical circumstances out of which it arose. The phrase does not signify 
only situations in which it would be impossible for states to achieve an end through individual action. 
Such a demanding standard would make it difficult to justify many clauses in Article I, Section 8. For 
example, the colonies declared independence and successfully prosecuted a war of independence 
without a national government that was empowered to raise and support a military by acting directly on 
individuals. The states under the Articles of Confederation were similarly situated, yet there was ample 
reason for the Constitution to give Congress the power to raise and support a military by compelling 
individual behavior. 
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financial conduct of business enterprises that “go bare” with respect to a risk 
and rely on federal bankruptcy protection in the event the risk materializes.28 
Thus, the decisive commerce power question is whether Congress could 
reasonably conclude that a requirement to obtain health insurance coverage or 
pay a fee will help to solve one or more significant collective action problems 
involving multiple states. 
The ACA minimum coverage provision is reasonably viewed as 
ameliorating two significant collective action problems involving multiple states. 
The first arises when a financially able individual declines to purchase health 
insurance. Such an individual is able to free ride on the benevolence of others in 
at least two ways. First, pursuant to federal and state law, as well as the 
longstanding charitable practices of most hospitals in the United States, others 
will pay a significant share of the cost of medical treatment rather than let an 
uninsured person go untreated.29 Second, even when the uninsured individual 
does not receive medical care for the time being, he benefits from the existence 
of the healthcare infrastructure and can rely on its availability in case of 
emergency. A requirement to obtain health insurance coverage or pay for going 
without insurance is designed in part to overcome risk-taking in reliance on 
benevolence.30 
Moreover, theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence suggest that this 
free rider problem is interstate in scope—that this collective action problem 
involving individuals causes a collective action problem for the states. It is 
interstate in scope because of the operation of many insurance companies in 
multiple states and the phenomenon of cross-state hospital use.31 
The minimum coverage provision addresses another collective action 
problem for the states: guaranteeing access to health insurance while avoiding 
adverse selection in insurance markets, which occurs when healthy people delay 
the purchase of health insurance until they become ill. The minimum coverage 
provision is part of a larger—concededly constitutional—regulation of 
economic conduct. No one disputes that the commerce power supports the 
ACA provisions that prohibit insurance companies from denying coverage 
based on preexisting conditions, canceling insurance absent fraud, charging 
higher premiums based on medical history, and imposing lifetime limits on 
benefits.32 These provisions solve collective action problems for the states by 
facilitating labor mobility, discouraging the flight of insurance companies from 
 
 28.  See infra notes 160–163, and accompanying text (discussing the practice of “going bare”).  
 29.  See infra notes 175–177, and accompanying text (discussing federal and state legislation and 
charitable hospital practices). Of course, not all participants in the interstate healthcare market are 
fairly described as benevolent. They may merely be complying with the law. The benevolence is 
embodied in federal and state laws and charitable social practices.  
 30.  This rationale for the minimum coverage provision obviously does not apply to individuals 
who go without health insurance and pay in full for the cost of their healthcare. In the event of severe 
injury or illness, however, such costs can bankrupt even wealthy individuals. 
 31.  For a discussion, see infra Part V.A.3. 
 32.  42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300gg, 300gg-1(a), 300gg-3(a), 300gg-11, 300gg-12 (West 2011). 
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states that guarantee access to states that do not, and disincentivizing states 
from free riding on the more generous healthcare systems of sister states. 
These ACA provisions, however, would be much less effective without the 
minimum coverage provision. Absent the provision, the ACA substantially 
increases the existing incentive for financially able individuals without insurance 
to free ride on healthy people with insurance by entering the market only when 
they expect to require expensive medical care. Insurance companies may not be 
financially viable if the law limits their ability to control costs but does not 
prevent such market-timing behavior. The close connection between the 
minimum coverage provision and the ACA’s restrictions on insurers justifies 
the provision under the interpretation of the Commerce Clause in United States 
v. Lopez33 and Gonzales v. Raich,34 and under the interpretation of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause in McCulloch v. Maryland35 and United States v. 
Comstock.36 
Part II of this article defines a free rider problem as a kind of collective 
action failure and identifies the two free rider problems to which the ACA 
responds. Part III discusses the constitutional challenges to the minimum 
coverage provision, focusing on the decisions of courts that have invalidated the 
provision. Part IV presents the theory of collective action federalism and 
explains generally when Congress possesses the authority to mandate private 
action using its commerce power. Part V applies the theory to the minimum 
coverage provision. 
The Conclusion suggests that the lawfulness of the minimum coverage 
provision solves what would otherwise be a puzzle created by the terms of the 
present debate over the constitutionality of healthcare reform. This puzzle is 
the conceded constitutionality of federal alternatives to the ACA that would 
displace state regulatory authority and infringe individual liberty to an equal or 
substantially greater extent. These alternatives include a materially equivalent 
scheme of taxes and tax credits, and a government-run, single-payer system of 
national healthcare. 
II 
THE MINIMUM COVERAGE PROVISION AND TWO FREE RIDER PROBLEMS 
A. Free Rider Problems Created by Mandated Access to Private Goods 
Positive externalities refer to unpriced benefits. They include “public 
goods,” which are goods or services supplied by the government whose 
technical characteristics require financing by taxes instead of prices. Public 
goods are nonrivalrous, meaning that one person’s enjoyment does not detract 
from another’s. Moreover, public goods are nonexcludable, meaning that it is 
 
 33.  514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 34.  545 U.S. 1 (2005).  
 35.  17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405–07, 421 (1819). 
 36.  130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956–58 (2010). 
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infeasible or uneconomical to exclude individuals from enjoying the benefits 
generated by the goods. A classic example of a public good is national defense. 
Private provision of public goods does not work because of free rider 
problems. When exclusion is infeasible or uneconomical, individuals have an 
incentive to free ride by not paying for the benefits they receive. When 
beneficiaries do not pay, private suppliers cannot earn a profit. Thus, the 
market undersupplies the good or service.37 The government can solve the free 
rider problem by collecting taxes to finance public goods, thereby requiring all 
who benefit from their provision to pay for them. 
Public goods may be analogized to, and distinguished from, mandated access 
to private goods. When the government and private actors mandate access to 
private goods, they in effect create nonexcludability by law and social practice. 
Nonexcludability, in turn, creates free rider problems. Once society decides—as 
a matter of public policy or private charity—not to allow the exclusion of 
anyone from access to private goods, free rider problems will exist. The free 
riders are individuals who obtain the private good, such as healthcare, or who 
benefit from its availability (even if they do not presently obtain it) without 
obtaining insurance coverage or otherwise paying in full for the care or access 
they receive. The free rider problem arises whenever the government and 
private entities require access to private goods.38 
By mandating access to private goods, society causes the production of 
positive externalities when selectively excluding certain potential beneficiaries 
is technically feasible but public policy prohibits doing so. For example, 
selective exclusion from access to emergency healthcare is technically feasible 
because emergency rooms could demand payment prior to rendering service. 
Nonetheless, a government or hospital may decide to require emergency rooms 
to provide access to anyone who needs it without regard to insurance status or 
ability to pay. 
Mandated access to a private good, however, is not a pure public good. If 
everyone descends on private providers of the good, at some point the good 
ceases to be nonrivalrous. The good is nonrivalrous only if it is used by a limited 
number of people. The solution to the free rider problem, however, is similar. 
Just as the government can prevent free riding by collecting taxes to finance 
public goods, so legislation can ameliorate free rider problems associated with 
mandated access to private goods. The ACA seeks to ameliorate two kinds of 
free rider problems caused by guaranteed access to private goods. 
 
 37.  Market failure provides the conventional economic justification for state supply and regulation 
of goods. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982). 
 38.  See, e.g., CHARLES E. PHELPS, HEALTH ECONOMICS 532 (4th ed. 2010) (observing that “those 
without insurance act as free riders on a health care system that has built into it (as a ‘safety net’) many 
ways of providing health care to persons who ‘show up at the door’ of health care providers, especially 
hospitals and most especially emergency rooms”).  
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B. The Affordable Care Act 
The ACA is “the biggest expansion of the social safety net in more than four 
decades, providing greater economic security to millions of poor and working-
class families.”39 A major objective of the law is to reduce the number of people 
living without health insurance in the United States, the only wealthy, 
industrialized democracy that does not guarantee its citizens basic health 
insurance coverage.40 According to the U.S. Census Bureau, around 19% of the 
nonelderly population, or roughly fifty million people, lacked health insurance 
in 2009.41 When he signed the bill into law, President Obama stated that “we 
have now just enshrined . . . the core principle that everybody should have some 
basic security when it comes to their health care.”42 
The ACA pursues this aspiration by seeking to achieve near-universal 
health insurance coverage. The law incentivizes, and helps, most American 
citizens and other legal residents to obtain adequate and affordable insurance.43 
The Congressional Budget Office projects that the ACA will increase the 
number of nonelderly individuals who possess insurance by roughly thirty-three 
million by 2019.44 If the law operates as intended, around 95% of all legal 
residents will be insured.45 
“By significantly reducing the number of the uninsured,” Congress found, 
 
 39.  THE STAFF OF THE WASHINGTON POST, LANDMARK: THE INSIDE STORY OF AMERICA’S 
NEW HEALTH-CARE LAW AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR US ALL 66–68 (2010) [hereinafter LANDMARK]. 
 40.  See, e.g., T.R. REID, THE HEALING OF AMERICA: A GLOBAL QUEST FOR BETTER, CHEAPER, 
AND FAIRER HEALTH CARE 3 (2009) (“All the other countries like us—that is, wealthy, 
technologically advanced, industrialized democracies—guarantee medical care to anyone who gets 
sick.”).  
 41.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH 
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2009, at 23, Table 8; see PHELPS, supra note 38, at 
531 (“Recent estimates put the number of Americans without insurance at about 47 million in 2006, 
representing 17% of people under 65. The rate of uninsurance climbs to 30% for the 18- to 24-year-old 
population.”).  
 42.  LANDMARK, supra note 39, at 1. For an argument that “universal health insurance is essential 
for human flourishing,” see generally J.P. Ruger, The Moral Foundations of Health Insurance, 100 Q.J. 
MED. 53 (2007). 
 43.  In various ways, the ACA seeks to ensure that people will be able to afford insurance. First, 
the law provides tax credits and subsidies to help people buy private insurance in new state-based 
“exchanges.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031 (West 2011). Thus Congress created federal tax credits for the 
premium payments of eligible individuals and families with household income between 133% and 
400% of the federal poverty line who purchase coverage through an exchange. 26 U.S.C.A. § 36B(a)–
(c) (West 2011). Congress also created subsidies to help cover out-of-pocket expenses like copayments 
or deductibles for eligible individuals who obtain coverage through an exchange. 42 U.S.C.A. § 18081 
(West 2011). Second, Congress expanded eligibility for Medicaid to all individuals with income below 
133% of the federal poverty line. Id. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII). Third, Congress created tax incentives 
for small businesses to buy health insurance for their employees. 26 U.S.C.A. § 45R (West 2011). 
Finally, Congress prescribed exactions for large employers that do not offer full-time employees 
adequate coverage if at least one full-time employee receives a tax credit to help with the purchase of 
coverage in an exchange. Id. § 4980H.  
 44.  Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf to John Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives 
(Feb. 18, 2011), 7–8.  
 45.  LANDMARK, supra note 39, at 73. 
SIEGEL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/3/2012 11:28 AM 
No. 3 2012] FREE RIDING ON BENEVOLENCE 37 
“the [ACA] . . . will lower health insurance premiums.”46 Congress determined 
that, in 2008 alone, the “cost of providing uncompensated care to the uninsured 
was $43,000,000,000.”47 Congress further found that “health care providers pass 
on the cost to private insurers, which pass on the cost to families. This cost-
shifting increases family premiums by on average over $1,000 a year.”48 
Much research confirms these congressional findings. For example, the 
American Hospital Association calculated that hospitals furnished more than 
$39 billion in uncompensated care to the under- or uninsured in 2009.49 The 
federal Department of Health and Human Services found that almost 20% of 
the nearly 120 million emergency department visits in 2006 were made by 
patients who lacked health insurance.50 A standard text in the field of health 
economics reports on “the apparent mechanism for receiving medical care” 
when individuals without insurance become ill: “Commonly, these people 
appear either at a hospital clinic or a hospital emergency room, often leading to 
hospitalization.”51 
In his survey of the research, Mark Hall reports that “almost two-thirds 
(62.6%) of people who are uninsured at a given point in time had at least one 
visit to a doctor or emergency room within the prior year,” and “virtually all of 
them (94%) receive some level of medical care at some point.”52 Moreover, 
“uninsured people pay for only about a third of the overall costs of the services 
they receive; the rest is paid by government, charity, or cost shifting to insured 
patients.”53 
Importantly, a significant share of the uninsured population in the United 
 
 46.  42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(F) (West 2011).  
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  AM. HOSP. ASS’N, UNCOMPENSATED HOSPITAL CARE COST FACT SHEET 4 (2010), 
http://www.aha.org/content/00-10/10uncompensatedcare.pdf. The AHA defines “uncompensated care” 
as “care provided for which no payment is received . . . delivered in U.S. hospitals.” Id. at 1. It is the 
sum of a hospital’s “bad debt” and charity care. Id. Charity care is care for which a hospital expects no 
reimbursement. A hospital incurs bad debt when it cannot obtain expected reimbursement. Id. 
 50.  U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NEW DATA SAY UNINSURED ACCOUNT FOR 
NEARLY ONE-FIFTH OF EMERGENCY ROOM VISITS (July 15, 2009), http://www.ahrq.gov/news/press/ 
pr2009/hhsuninserpr.htm. 
 51.  PHELPS, supra note 38, at 532 (noting the findings that “hospital use is relatively insensitive to 
insurance coverage”). 
 52.  Mark A. Hall, Commerce Clause Challenges to Health Care Reform, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1825, 
1832 n.29 (2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 53.  Id. (citations omitted); see, e.g., FAMILIES USA, HIDDEN HEALTH TAX: AMERICANS PAY A 
PREMIUM 2 (2009) (finding that the uninsured in the United States received $116 billion worth of care 
from hospitals, doctors, and other providers in 2008; that government programs and charities paid for 
26% of this care; and that around $42.7 billion was unpaid and thus uncompensated care); Sara 
Rosenbaum & Jonathan Gruber, Buying Health Care, the Individual Mandate, and the Constitution, 363 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 401, 402 (2010) (“Far from being passive and noneconomic, the uninsured consume 
more than $50 billion in uncompensated care, the costs of which are passed through health care 
institutions to insured Americans. . . . [M]edical expenses not covered by insurance are one of the 
leading causes of bankruptcy in the United States, and the costs of resolving those bankruptcies are 
borne throughout the U.S. economy.”). 
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States consists of individuals who are financially able to purchase health 
insurance. Researchers have estimated that as much as “20 percent of uninsured 
individuals have the financial means to obtain coverage but forgo it, relying 
instead on emergency care when they need medical treatment.”54 Although 
some question the extent to which there is a free rider problem involving 
uncompensated care,55 economists have shown that public insurance programs, 
including uncompensated care reimbursement funds, reduce the purchase of 
private health insurance. These findings confirm the predictions of theoretical 
models of individual choice.56 The import of this “crowding out” effect is that a 
substantial percentage of uninsured people who consume healthcare without 
paying for it in full have the financial means to obtain health insurance coverage 
and would obtain it if cost shifting were impossible. 
It is uncertain and disputed how much of the cost shifting problem is 
attributable to individuals who have the financial means to obtain health 
insurance coverage. Although it is clear that many individuals who shift costs to 
others cannot afford to purchase private insurance, it is also clear that many 
individuals who shift costs to others can afford to purchase private insurance.57 
Moreover, even young and healthy people can be traumatically injured at any 
moment and can reasonably rely on access to life-saving treatment in case of 
emergency. In all likelihood, significantly fewer individuals would choose to go 
without insurance if they knew that they were on their own if they fell gravely ill 
or were severely injured. 
The ACA targets this cost shifting problem with the minimum coverage 
 
 54.  Brief for America’s Health Insurance Plans as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 
8–9, Virginia v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011) (Nos. 11–1057 & 11–1058), 2011 WL 795219 
[hereinafter Brief for America’s Health Insurance Plans] (reporting that when uninsured individuals 
require care, “hospitals and other providers charge those who do have coverage higher prices”; that the 
“higher prices, in turn, translate into increased health insurance premiums for those who purchase 
insurance coverage”; and that the “insured are ultimately hit with a ‘hidden tax’ ranging from two to 
ten percent of private premiums to pay for this uncompensated care”) (citations omitted). 
 55.  Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey H. Kahn, Commentary, Free Rider: A Justification for Mandatory 
Medical Insurance Under Health Care Reform?, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 78, 79 (2011). 
 56.  See generally Kevin N. Rask & Kimberly J. Rask, Public Insurance Substituting for Private 
Insurance: New Evidence Regarding Public Hospitals, Uncompensated Care Funds, and Medicaid, 19 J. 
HEALTH ECON. 1 (2000) (finding that the presence or increased generosity of public health insurance 
programs, whether structured as direct provision of services, as provider subsidies, or as direct 
insurance, lowered the likelihood of carrying private insurance coverage); cf. David Cutler & Jonathan 
Gruber, Does Public Insurance Crowd Out Private Insurance?, 111 Q.J. ECON. 391 (1996) (finding that 
Medicaid expansions were associated with a significant transition from private health insurance to 
being uninsured). 
 57.  See Mark A. Hall, The Factual Bases for Constitutional Challenges to Federal Health Insurance 
Reform, 38 N. KY. L. REV. 457, 477 (2011) (“[H]ospital administrators report that they collect only 
about ten percent of their charges to uninsured patients. This highly-subsidized care is not restricted to 
uninsured people without means to pay, but includes people well above poverty. Among adults who 
decline the option to enroll with employer-sponsored insurance, public sources and uncompensated 
care cover 72% of total costs.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Bradley Herring, The 
Effect of the Availability of Charity Care to the Uninsured on the Demand for Private Health Insurance, 
24 J. HEALTH ECON. 225–52 (2005) (finding that individuals above 300% of the federal poverty level 
on average paid for only about one-half of the care they received). 
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provision. The provision requires nonexempted individuals to maintain a 
minimum level of health insurance coverage or pay a yearly fee.58 This exaction 
is inapplicable to people who need not file a federal income tax return because 
their household incomes are too low, to people whose premium payments 
would be greater than 8% of their household income, to individuals who are 
uninsured for short periods of time, to members of Native American tribes, and 
to people who show that compliance with the requirement would impose a 
hardship.59 The minimum coverage provision seeks to ameliorate the cost 
shifting that occurs when individuals who have the financial means to purchase 
insurance consume healthcare without insurance and do not pay in full, thereby 
free riding on other participants in the health insurance and healthcare 
markets.60 
The minimum coverage provision also seeks to address a second kind of free 
rider problem: adverse selection (or self-selection) in insurance markets.61 The 
problem arises, even absent mandated access to healthcare, because people 
know more about their own health status than insurance companies do. Before 
the ACA, health insurance companies had managed the costs borne by existing 
policyholders through an actuarial process known as underwriting.62 
Specifically, insurance companies assessed the health status of each applicant 
for insurance; predicted the likely medical costs associated with different health 
statuses; and either offered coverage to certain individuals, declined to offer 
coverage to certain individuals, or offered coverage subject to various 
exceptions and limitations. These underwriting practices ameliorated the 
adverse-selection problem but did not eliminate it because of the information 
asymmetry between insurers and potential insureds. 
The ACA exacerbates the adverse-selection problem by changing the way in 
which private health insurance markets operate. The ACA requires insurers to 
provide and renew coverage to anyone who wants coverage and pays the 
premium.63 The law prohibits insurers from denying coverage based on 
preexisting conditions, charging higher premiums based on an individual’s 
medical history, canceling insurance absent fraud, and imposing lifetime limits 
 
 58.  26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (West 2011). The minimum coverage provision goes into effect on 
January 1, 2014. It applies to U.S. citizens and legal residents. It does not apply to undocumented 
aliens, people in prison, and people with certain religious objections.  
 59.  Id. § 5000A(e). In 2014, the annual exaction for non-insurance will be the greater of $95 or 1% 
of income. By 2016, the annual exaction will be the greater of $695 or 2.5% of income. Id. § 5000A(c). 
 60.  It is important to distinguish between individuals who have the financial ability to purchase 
health insurance and individuals who do not. People who cannot afford to buy coverage still shift costs, 
but as noted in the text, the ACA’s exaction for going without insurance does not apply to them. 
Moreover, they are not fairly described as choosing not to purchase insurance, nor are they fairly 
criticized for free riding on the contributions of others to collective action.  
 61.  See, e.g., PHELPS, supra note 38, at 318–19. For an empirical analysis of the welfare costs of the 
adverse selection problem in health insurance markets, see generally David M. Cutler & Sarah J. 
Reber, Paying for Health Insurance: The Trade-Off Between Competition and Adverse Selection, 113 
Q.J. ECON. 433 (1998).  
 62.  See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(J) (West 2011).  
 63.  Id. §§ 300gg-1, 300gg-2.  
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on benefits.64 
These insurance practices encourage individuals to purchase insurance 
before they require extensive care. Because the ACA eliminates them, insurers 
will instead set premiums based on the average expected costs generated by an 
insurance company’s entire risk pool. Other things being equal, this change 
would render participation in the pool relatively more attractive to older, sicker 
individuals and less attractive to younger, healthier people. Costs would rise for 
individuals who have insurance and individuals without insurance would have 
even more incentive to remain uninsured until they become ill. The result 
would be even more cost shifting to other actors in the interstate healthcare 
market. 
Once the law forbids insurers from denying coverage to sick applicants, a 
person who does not buy insurance until he is already sick free rides on people 
who buy insurance while they are still healthy. Indeed, the very concept of 
insuring against a risk unravels when “insurance” may be purchased after the 
risk has already materialized. The minimum coverage provision seeks to make 
it economically feasible for insurers to comply with the ACA’s changes in the 
methods used by insurers to spread risk and price premiums. By requiring 
almost everyone to obtain health insurance coverage or pay a yearly fee, the 
provision reduces the incentive to remain uninsured until one becomes ill. 
Congress found that the insurance “requirement is essential to creating effective 
health insurance markets that do not require underwriting and eliminate its 
associated administrative costs.”65 
III 
THE CHALLENGES TO THE MINIMUM COVERAGE PROVISION 
Although the ACA contains many provisions, the numerous constitutional 
challenges to the statute focus primarily on the minimum coverage provision.66 
A key question that is emerging is whether the provision is supported by the 
Commerce Clause67—either alone or in combination with the Necessary and 
Proper Clause.68 
 
 64.  Id. §§ 300gg, 300gg-1(a), 300gg-3(a), 300gg-11, 300gg-12. 
 65.  Id. § 18091(a)(2)(J). 
 66.  Additional questions include whether the TAIA (see supra note 6) bars pre-enforcement 
challenges to the exaction for going without insurance; whether any state plaintiff has standing to sue; 
whether the minimum coverage provision is severable from the rest of the ACA; whether it is 
unconstitutionally coercive under South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), for Congress to condition 
all existing federal Medicaid funding on the states’ acceptance of new expansions to the Medicaid 
program; whether Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause to mandate that employers offer 
employees a certain level of health insurance coverage or pay a penalty; and whether the mandate 
violates principles of religious freedom protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment 
Clause, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, or the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. In 
addition to the constitutionality of the minimum coverage provision, the Supreme Court has granted 
certiorari on the TAIA question, the severability question, and the Medicaid expansion. 
 67.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 68.  Id. at cl. 18. 
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To date, no federal court has upheld the minimum coverage provision as 
within the scope of Congress’s tax power.69 By contrast, the federal courts 
presently disagree about whether the provision is justified by the Commerce 
Clause. So far, three federal district courts and two federal courts of appeals 
have rejected commerce power challenges to the provision.70 Three other 
federal district courts and one federal court of appeals have held that the 
provision is beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause.71 The latter district 
courts reasoned that Congress may regulate only economic activity using its 
commerce power and that the provision regulates inactivity—specifically, the 
failure to purchase health insurance. The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit reasoned similarly in invalidating the minimum coverage 
provision.72 
In Virginia v. Sebelius,73 which involved a constitutional challenge to the 
ACA brought by the Commonwealth of Virginia, the district court read the 
Supreme Court’s commerce power decisions as directing first that “the subject 
matter must be economic in nature and affect interstate commerce, and second, 
it must involve activity.”74 The court observed that “[e]very application of 
Commerce Clause power found to be constitutionally sound by the Supreme 
Court involved some sort of action, transaction, or deed placed in motion by an 
 
 69.  But cf. Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, No. 10–2347, 2011 WL 3962915, at *16 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 
2011) (Wynn, J., concurring) (“[W]ere I to reach the merits, I would uphold the constitutionality of the 
Affordable Care Act on the basis that Congress had the authority to enact the individual and employer 
mandates under its plenary taxing power.”). For an argument that the ACA exaction for non-insurance 
is materially equivalent to a tax, see Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Not the Power to Destroy: A 
Theory of the Tax Power for a Court that Limits the Commerce Power, 99 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2013). Commentators dispute whether the General Welfare Clause supports the minimum coverage 
provision. Compare, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health 
Insurance Mandate is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581, 607–14 (2010) (arguing that the 
minimum coverage provision is beyond the scope of the tax power), with, e.g., Brief of Constitutional 
Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellees, Liberty Univ., No. 10–2347, 2011 
WL 3962915 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 2011) (arguing that the tax power authorizes the minimum coverage 
provision), and Brian Galle, Conditional Taxation and the Constitutionality of Health Care Reform, 120 
YALE L.J. ONLINE 27 (2010), http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/889.pdf.  
 70.  See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011); Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 
F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2011); Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, 
753 F. Supp. 2d 611 (W.D. Va. 2010); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. 
Mich. 2010). 
 71.  Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 
2011); Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (N.D. Fla. 
2011); Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 1:10–CV–763, 2011 WL 4072875 
(M.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2011); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010).  
 72.  Notwithstanding the emphasis of these courts on the coerciveness of the minimum coverage 
provision in their commerce power analyses, Lochner-style substantive due process challenges to the 
provision are not surviving motions to dismiss. See, e.g., Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1161–62 (N.D. Fla. 2010). The Supreme Court has not 
held that a statute violates freedom from contract since the constitutional crisis of 1937. Compare, e.g., 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), with W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937). 
 73.  728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
 74.  Id. at 781. 
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individual or legal entity.”75 Reasoning from this premise, it stated that the 
“constitutional viability of the Minimum Essential Coverage Provision in this 
case turns on whether or not a person’s decision to refuse to purchase health 
care insurance is such an activity.”76 The court concluded that such a decision is 
not activity because neither the Supreme Court nor any federal court of appeals 
“has extended Commerce Clause powers to compel an individual to 
involuntarily enter the stream of commerce by purchasing a commodity in the 
private market.”77 It was particularly concerned that a rationale “requiring 
advance purchase of insurance based on a future contingency” would also 
“apply to transportation, housing, or nutritional decisions,” and thus “lacks 
logical limitation.”78 
Similarly, in Florida v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services,79 a 
case involving a constitutional challenge to the ACA brought by the attorneys 
general of twenty states and the governors of six more, the district court 
concluded that “[i]t would be a radical departure from existing case law to hold 
that Congress can regulate inactivity under the Commerce Clause.”80 According 
to the court, if Congress “has the power to compel an otherwise passive 
individual into a commercial transaction with a third party,” then “it is not 
hyperbolizing to suggest that Congress could do almost anything it wanted.”81 
The court raised the specter of Congress’s “mandating that every adult 
purchase and consume wheat bread daily, rationalized on the grounds that 
because everyone must participate in the market for food, non-consumers of 
wheat bread adversely affect prices in the wheat market.”82 “Congress could,” it 
asserted, “require that people buy and consume broccoli at regular intervals, 
not only because the required purchases will positively impact interstate 
commerce, but also because people who eat healthier tend to be healthier, and 
are thus more productive and put less of a strain on the health care system.”83 
According to the court, “[t]o now hold that Congress may regulate the so-called 
‘economic decision’ to not purchase a product or service in anticipation of 
future consumption is a ‘bridge too far.’ It is without logical limitation and far 
exceeds the existing legal boundaries established by Supreme Court 
precedent.”84 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in partially 
affirming the judgment of the Florida district court,85 purported not to rely on 
 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id.  
 77.  Id. at 782.  
 78.  Id. at 781.  
 79.  780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (N.D. Fla. 2011). 
 80.  Id. at 1286. 
 81.  Id.  
 82.  Id. at 1289.  
 83.  Id.  
 84.  Id. at 1294–95. 
 85.  The Eleventh Circuit rejected the district court’s conclusion that the minimum coverage 
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the plaintiffs’ and the district court’s distinction between inactivity and activity.86 
The distinction, however, did the decisive work in the court’s analysis. For 
example, after stating that “[i]t is immaterial whether we perceive Congress to 
be regulating inactivity or a financial decision to forego insurance,” the court 
insisted that “[u]nder any framing, the regulated conduct is defined by the 
absence of both commerce or even the ‘the production, distribution, and 
consumption of commodities’—the broad definition of economics in Raich.”87 
In passages such as this one, the court of appeals avoided characterizing the 
minimum coverage provision as a regulation of “inactivity” only by recasting it 
as a regulation of “noncommerce.” But the court viewed the provision as 
regulating the absence of commerce only because individuals subject to it are 
(allegedly) not active in the stream of commerce.88 The court seemed to change 
the terminology, not the analysis.89 
As explained in Part V.A.2, it is far from clear that the financial decision to 
go without insurance is properly characterized as “inactivity” for purposes of 
analysis under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
Nonetheless, the ACA litigation to date invites examination of whether it 
matters how such conduct is characterized. I turn now to the constitutional 
relevance of the distinction between inactivity and activity. I begin by 
introducing the theory of collective action federalism. 
IV 
THE THEORY OF COLLECTIVE ACTION FEDERALISM 
A. History 
The Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to regulate “Commerce . . . 
among the several States.”90 It is the third clause of Article I, Section 8. The 
Framers wrote Section 8 in order to address several collective action problems 
facing the United States during the Critical Period of the 1780s.91 They 
 
provision was not severable from the balance of the ACA. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t 
Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 86.  Id. at 1285 (“Whereas the parties and many commentators have focused on this distinction 
between activity and inactivity, we find it useful only to a point. . . . [W]e are not persuaded that the 
formalistic dichotomy of activity and inactivity provides a workable or persuasive enough answer in this 
case.”).  
 87.  Id. at 1293 (quoting Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005)). 
 88.  The court defined “[t]he question before us” as “whether Congress may regulate individuals 
outside the stream of commerce, on the theory that those ‘economic and financial decisions’ to avoid 
commerce themselves substantially affect interstate commerce.” Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 
1292. 
 89.  Accord Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 1:10–CV–763, 2011 WL 
4072875, at *14 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2011) (“To date, all exercises of Commerce Clause authority have 
proscribed or prescribed activity by individuals already engaged in commerce who are active in the 
relevant interstate market.”).  
 90.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 91.  For a discussion, see Larry D. Kramer, Madison’s Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611, 616–23 
(1999). 
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especially wanted to protect the states from commercial warfare against one 
another and from military warfare by foreigners. In the Critical Period, the 
states acted individually when they needed to act collectively, discriminating 
against interstate commerce and free riding on the contributions of other states 
to the federal treasury and the American military.92 Moreover, Congress lacked 
power under the Articles of Confederation to address these problems.93 
James Madison saw the collective action problems in his Vices of the 
Political System of the United States,94 a memorandum he wrote while preparing 
for the Constitutional Convention.95 Recording various problems with the 
Articles of Confederation,96 Madison underscored “want of concert in matters 
where common interest requires it,” a “defect . . . strongly illustrated in the state 
of our commercial affairs. How much has the national dignity, interest, and 
revenue suffered from this cause?”97 When activities spilled over from one state 
to another, Madison and other nationalist Framers recognized that the actions 
of individually rational states produced irrational results for the nation. This is 
one kind of collective action problem. The solution lay with the establishment 
of a more comprehensive unit of government. The federal government would 
require the authority to tax, regulate interstate and international commerce, 
raise and support a military, and act directly on individuals. 
The delegates at the Philadelphia Convention, in considering the scope of 
congressional power that would become Section 8, focused on collective action 
problems for the states.98 The Convention instructed the midsummer 
Committee of Detail that Congress have authority “to legislate in all Cases for 
the general Interests of the Union, and also in those Cases to which the States 
are separately incompetent, or in which the Harmony of the United States may 
be interrupted by the Exercise of individual Legislation.”99 This language 
apprehends the need to address collective action problems facing the states.100 
Significantly, when the Committee of Detail made its report ten days later, “[i]t 
 
 92.  See, e.g., Cooter & Siegel, supra note 10, at 121–24.  
 93.  See, e.g., JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF 
THE CONSTITUTION 24–28, 47–48, 102–08, 167–68, 188–89 (1996) (discussing various failures of the 
Articles of Confederation). Almost all of the first thirty-six essays in The Federalist detail the 
inadequacies of the Articles.  
 94.  James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States, in JAMES MADISON: 
WRITINGS 69, 78–79 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999). 
 95.  See RAKOVE, supra note 93, at 46. 
 96.  Madison, supra note 94, at 69–73.  
 97.  Id. at 71.  
 98.  As Akhil Amar explains, “Federal power over genuinely interstate and international affairs lay 
at the heart of the plan approved by the Philadelphia delegates.” AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S 
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 108 (2005).  
 99.  2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 131–32 (Max Farrand ed., rev. 
ed. 1966). 
 100.  It is not clear how each part of the quoted language fits with the other parts. Donald Regan 
explains that “[t]he Framers themselves were unclear about the precise reach and interrelations of the 
various clauses.” Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally 
Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554, 570 n.70 (1995).  
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had changed the indefinite language of Resolution VI into an enumeration of 
the powers of Congress closely resembling Article I, Section 8 of the 
Constitution as it was finally adopted.”101 
The Committee’s “radical change” was uncontroversial among the 
delegates; the Convention “accepted without discussion the enumeration of 
powers made by a committee which had been directed . . . that the Federal 
Government was ‘to legislate in all cases for the general interests of the 
Union . . . and in those to which the states are separately incompetent.’”102 The 
delegates apparently grasped the link between the general principles stated in 
Resolution VI and the specific powers conferred in Article I, Section 8. As 
numerous scholars have concluded, the Committee was embracing—not 
rejecting—the Resolution’s concern about multi-state collective action 
problems when it provided an enumeration.103 
Robert Cooter and I have observed that the eighteen clauses of Section 8 
mostly concern collective action problems created by two kinds of spillovers: 
interstate externalities and national markets.104 Clauses 1 and 10 through 16 give 
Congress the power to internalize the externalities associated with providing for 
the common defense, establishing a postal network, and securing intellectual 
property rights.105 Clauses 3 through 6 give Congress the power to combat 
various impediments to the successful operation of interstate markets.106 
B. Theory 
The theory of collective action federalism draws from this history, from this 
evidence in the constitutional text, from subsequent historical understandings 
and mistakes, and from economics to provide a structural account of the 
American federal system established in part by Article I, Section 8. The various 
clauses of Section 8 form a coherent set—not a heterogeneous collection of 
unrelated powers. Coherence comes from the connection that the specific 
powers have to collective action problems that the federal government can 
address more effectively than the states can address by acting alone. 
The states often cannot achieve an end when doing so requires multiple 
 
 101.  Robert L. Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States Than One, 47 HARV. L. REV. 
1335, 1340 (1934).  
 102.  Id.  
 103.  See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 10, at 11 (“[T]here is no evidence that the convention rejected the 
structural principle stated in Resolution VI at any point during its proceedings. Indeed, this principle 
was the animating purpose of the list of enumerated powers that appeared in the final draft . . . .”) 
(emphasis added); Regan, supra note 100, at 556 (“[T]here is no reason to think the Committee of 
Detail was rejecting the spirit of the Resolution when they replaced it with an enumeration.”); Stern, 
supra note 101, at 1340 (“If the Convention had thought that the committee’s enumeration was a 
departure from the general standard for the division of powers to which it had thrice agreed, there can 
be little doubt that the subject would have been thoroughly debated on the Convention floor.”). 
 104.  See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 10, at 144–50 (analyzing the eighteen clauses of Article I, 
Section 8). 
 105.  Id. at 147–49. 
 106.  Id. at 149–50. 
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states to cooperate—that is, when doing so requires collective action. For 
example, collective action may be required in “race to the bottom” situations, 
when the states generally share the same objective but individually have 
insufficient incentives to take steps to achieve it. In this circumstance, the 
rational self-interest of individual states is misaligned with the collective interest 
of the states as a whole. Individual states may have poor incentives to act either 
because they can instead free ride on the contributions of other states to 
collective action, or because they anticipate that sister states will free ride on 
their own contributions to collective action.107 
Although a race to the bottom is an important kind of collective action 
problem that justifies federal regulation, it is not the only one. Limiting 
collective action problems to races to the bottom would have radical 
implications for the constitutional scope of federal power. For example, 
collective action by the states may be required when one state or group of states 
imposes external costs on other states, such as by generating pollution that 
crosses states lines. In such a situation, the state producing the pollution and the 
states being polluted may not share the objective of reducing pollution. On the 
contrary, people in states such as Texas and California often have different 
views on the appropriate tradeoff between economic development and 
environmental protection.108 Even so, internalizing an interstate pollution 
externality requires collective action among the affected states, which justifies 
federal intervention.109 
Similarly, consider a historical example of enormous significance.110 Racial 
discrimination in America during the second half of the twentieth century 
caused a collective action problem for the states. In the 1960s, this collective 
action problem was not the fact that southern states wanted to abandon 
 
 107.  See, e.g., Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 588 (1937) (placing special emphasis on a 
race to the bottom among the states in upholding the federal unemployment compensation system 
created by the Social Security Act). 
 108.  Moreover, a state may not suffer the effects of pollution it creates. See, e.g., JAMES SALZMAN 
& BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 22 (3d ed. 2010) (using the 
example of acid rain to illustrate that “[a]ir pollution, water pollution, and wildlife certainly pay no 
heed to state . . . borders, with the result that often the generator of the pollution is politically distinct 
from those harmed”); see also Press Release, N.Y. State Att’y Gen., Northeast States Press for Clean 
Air (Jan. 8, 2002), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/media_center/2002/jan/jan08a_02.html (last visited 
Jan. 19, 2012) (quoting Rhode Island Attorney General Sheldon Whitehouse’s statement that 
“outdated coal-fired electric plants in the Midwest make cheap power for Midwestern corporations, 
and prevailing winds blow their pollution onto us,” and that “ozone pollution from the Midwest is so 
bad that even if we stopped all our in-state emissions entirely, we would still fail federal ozone 
standards in Rhode Island”). 
 109.  For a lucid explanation of why spillover effects justify federal regulation, see generally Richard 
Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341 (1996); see also 
Cooter & Siegel, supra note 10, at 172–75 (articulating a collective action rationale for federal 
regulation of interstate environmental externalities). 
 110.  See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding Title II of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited racial discrimination by places of public 
accommodation); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding Title II’s application to a 
small, family-owned restaurant). 
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discrimination but had insufficient incentive to do so on an individual basis. No 
doubt most (white) voters in southern states had no desire to abandon 
discrimination. But the fact that some states practiced racial discrimination 
created a significant burden on commerce with those states that did not practice 
discrimination, impeding both interstate mobility and the optimal allocation of 
resources across state lines.111 A remedy to this interstate externality required 
collective action by the states.112 Accordingly, the theory of collective action 
federalism provides a justification for federal power over discrimination 
affecting interstate commerce.113 
Whether the cause of a problem requiring collective action is a race to the 
bottom or an interstate spillover effect, the theory of collective action 
federalism concludes that the clauses of Section 8 empower Congress to solve 
the problem because it predictably frustrates the states. In the language of the 
Commerce Clause, such a problem is “among the several States.” Conversely, a 
problem that does not require collective action by the states is internal to a state 
or local. Thus the foundation of federalism in Section 8 flows from the relative 
advantages of the federal government and the states. The theory of collective 
action federalism reads the clauses of Section 8 as giving the federal and state 
governments the power to do what each does best.114 
The distinction between individual and collective action by states gives 
independent, sensible meaning to the phrase “among the several States” in the 
Commerce Clause. According to the theory of collective action federalism, the 
phrase “among the several States” references a collective action problem 
involving at least two states.115 This is the key inquiry in determining whether 
 
 111.  The briefing on the federal government’s side in Heart of Atlanta stressed the interstate 
externalities caused by racial discrimination in certain states. See generally, e.g., Brief for State of 
California as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee, Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 
U.S. 241 (1964) (No. 515), 1964 WL 81384. 
 112.  Accord Balkin, supra note 10, at 7 (“Properly understood, the commerce power authorizes 
Congress to regulate problems or activities that produce spillover effects between states or generate 
collective action problems that concern more than one state.”). Whereas Balkin identifies spillover 
effects and collective action problems as separate categories that both fall within the scope of federal 
commerce power, I identify spillover effects as causing a collective action problem, which justifies 
federal commerce power. The result is the same. 
 113.  Of course, the moral and historical bases for civil rights legislation lie elsewhere, which may 
call into question the restrictions that the Supreme Court has imposed on the enforcement clauses of 
the Civil War Amendments.  
 114.  As Donald Regan has written, “[W]hen we are trying to decide whether some federal law or 
program can be justified under the commerce power, we should ask ourselves the question, ‘Is there 
some reason the federal government must be able to do this, some reason why we cannot leave the 
matter to the states?’” Regan, supra note 100, at 555; see also Ann Althouse, Enforcing Federalism 
After United States v. Lopez, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 793, 817 (1996) (“We should begin a reconstruction of 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence that looks deeply into why it is good for some matters to be governed 
by a uniform federal standard, why it is good for some things to remain under the control of the various 
states, and what effect these choices will have on the federal courts.”). See Stephen G. Calabresi & 
Nicholas K. Terrell, The Number of States and the Economics of American Federalism, 63 FLA. L. REV. 
1, 6 (2011) (“The most compelling argument in American history for empowering our national 
government has been the need to overcome collective action problems.”).  
 115.  Notably, Chief Justice Marshall wrote in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194 (1824), 
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“Commerce,”116 understood under current law in terms of the Court’s 
economic–noneconomic categorization, is interstate and thus regulable under 
the Commerce Clause or else is intrastate and thus beyond the scope of the 
commerce power.117 Even if the economic–noneconomic categorization can 
suffice as a rough definition of “Commerce,” it cannot define when such 
commerce is “among the several States” and when it is internal to one state. 
From a collective action perspective, it makes little sense to conclude that 
only the states may address a particular problem even though the states are 
“separately incompetent” to handle the problem.118 This was a fatal flaw of the 
Lochner Court’s federalism jurisprudence, which rejected the idea that “the 
power of the federal government inherently extends to purposes affecting the 
nation as a whole with which the states severally cannot deal or cannot 
adequately deal.”119 To the Lochner Court, it was of little relevance to the 
proper scope of congressional power in Section 8 that “[t]here are many 
subjects in respect of which the several states have not legislated in harmony 
with one another, and in which their varying laws and the failure of some of 
them to act at all have resulted in injurious confusion and embarrassment.”120 
The Lochner Court’s federalism jurisprudence was not just bad political theory 
or economics. As explained by the theory of collective action federalism, it was 
bad constitutional law in light of a principal purpose of the clauses of Section 8: 
to authorize Congress to solve collective action problems facing states. 
C. Doctrine 
The distinction between problems that require collective action by the states 
and those that do not best explains why Congress may not usually use its 
commerce power to regulate such crimes as assault or gun possession in schools 
but may regulate an interstate market for guns, wheat, or drugs. In other words, 
the theory of collective action federalism offers a way to distinguish the “truly 
national” from the “truly local” in the context of the Commerce Clause,121 
justifying the outcomes in Wickard v. Filburn,122 United States v. Lopez,123 United 
 
that the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to regulate “that commerce which concerns more 
States than one.”  
 116.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 117.  Collective action federalism is a theory of what Section 8 means, not a theory of how 
vigorously the federal courts should review what Congress has purported to do using its Section 8 
powers. The theory to date does not include an account of judicial deference or nondeference. See 
Cooter & Siegel, supra note 10, at 154.  
 118.  2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 99, at 131–32.  
 119.  Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 291 (1936) (“The proposition . . . that the power of the 
federal government inherently extends to purposes affecting the Nation as a whole with which the 
states severally cannot deal or cannot adequately deal . . . ha[s] never been accepted but always 
definitely rejected by this court.”); see Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 273 (1918) (“There is no 
power vested in Congress to require the states to exercise their police power so as to prevent possible 
unfair competition.”). 
 120.  Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. at 292. 
 121.  United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000). 
 122.  317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
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States v. Morrison,124 and Gonzales v. Raich.125 
The Court offered collective action problems as a reason to uphold federal 
laws in many of the Commerce Clause cases decided from 1937 until the 
1990s.126 So, too, the Rehnquist Court implicitly considered collective action 
problems in determining the constitutionality of congressional regulation. Chief 
Justice Rehnquist wrote in Lopez that the Gun-Free School Zones Act “is not 
an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the 
regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were 
regulated.”127 This statement suggests that the absence of regulation of guns 
near schools in one state would not undercut the effectiveness of regulations 
prohibiting them in other states. Justice Kennedy wrote that if a state or local 
government “determines that harsh criminal sanctions are necessary and wise to 
deter students from carrying guns on school premises, the reserved powers of 
the States are sufficient to enact those measures. Indeed, over forty states 
already have criminal laws outlawing the possession of firearms on or near 
school grounds.”128 
In Lopez, there was no significant spillover of welfare across state lines that 
caused a collective action problem. Raich, by contrast, did involve a potential 
spillover problem. Because marijuana used for medicinal purposes is 
indistinguishable from marijuana used for other purposes, and because the 
market for marijuana disrespects state borders, California’s authorization of 
marijuana use for medicinal purposes might make it more difficult for other 
states to enforce their bans on marijuana use. If there is no spillover problem, 
states should be permitted to go their own way from the perspective of 
constitutional federalism (as opposed to individual rights).129 But a spillover 
provides a rationale for federal intervention. 
The Supreme Court also employed collective action reasoning in a recent 
decision construing the Necessary and Proper Clause.130 The issue in United 
 
 123.  514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 124.  529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 125.  545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 126.  See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 10, at 159–62 (discussing collective action reasoning in 
numerous Commerce Clause decisions decided between 1937 and 1995, including United States v. 
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. 
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), and Hodel v. Virginia 
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981)).  
 127.  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. 
 128.  Id. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see Regan, supra note 100, at 566 
(reading this part of Justice Kennedy’s opinion from a collective action perspective). 
 129.  A collective action approach does not explain the proper scope of federal powers authorized 
by the enforcement clauses of the Civil War Amendments. U.S. CONST
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States v. Comstock131 was whether Congress has the power under Article I, 
Section 8 to authorize the Attorney General of the United States to civilly 
commit mentally ill, sexually dangerous federal prisoners after the completion 
of their federal sentences if no state will accept custody of them. The Court held 
7–2 that Congress has such authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
relying in part on the fact that the case implicated a collective action problem 
involving multiple states. 
The Court recognized the “NIMBY” problem (“not in my backyard”). 
After the sentence of a sexually dangerous prisoner has expired, the federal 
government might release him for civil commitment in any number of states, 
including the state where he had been tried or the state where he is presently 
housed. A state that agrees to assume custody of the prisoner must pay all the 
financial costs associated with indefinite civil commitment while other states 
potentially enjoy all the benefits from committing the individual, who might 
otherwise move out of state. If not committed, he might move out of state upon 
release in part because the federal government had severed the prisoner’s ties 
to the state by incarcerating him for a long time. Rather than dwell on the fact 
that the federal government helped to create the problem that it now sought to 
solve, the Court underscored evidence that states often refuse to assume 
custody, potentially hoping to free ride on some other state’s decision to do 
so.132 Both the Court and Justices Kennedy and Alito, who concurred in the 
judgment, stressed the relationship between the federal statute at issue and a 
multi-state collective action problem, which the federal government is better 
situated to address than the states.133 
D. Mandates 
The clauses of Article I, Section 8 extend federal legislative authority to 
collective action problems involving multiple states. It is constitutionally 
irrelevant whether federal regulation takes the form of an “individual mandate” 
 
 131.  130 S. Ct. 1949, 1961–62 (2010).  
 132.  Id. at 1959 (quoting a 1945 Judicial Conference report finding that “[s]tates would not accept 
an ‘appreciable number’ of ‘mental[ly] incompetent’ individuals ‘nearing expiration’ of their prison 
terms, because of their ‘lack of legal residence in any State,’ even though those individuals ‘ought not . . 
. be at large because they constitute a menace to public safety’”); id. at 1961 (“Congress could . . . have 
reasonably concluded (as detailed in the Judicial Conference’s report) that a reasonable number of 
such individuals would likely not be detained by the States if released from federal custody, in part 
because the Federal Government itself severed their claim to legal residence in any State by 
incarcerating them in remote federal prisons.”) (quotation marks omitted).  
 133.  Justice Kennedy emphasized that “Federal prisoners often lack a single home State to take 
charge of them due to their lengthy prison stays, so it is incumbent on the National Government to 
act.” Id. at 1968 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). Similarly, Justice Alito underscored the 
statute’s recognition “that, in many cases, no State will assume the heavy financial burden of civilly 
committing a dangerous federal prisoner who, as a result of lengthy federal incarceration, no longer has 
any substantial ties to any State.” Id. at 1969 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment); see id. at 1970 (“These 
federal prisoners, having been held for years in a federal prison, often had few ties to any State; it was a 
matter of speculation where they would choose to go upon release; and accordingly no State was 
enthusiastic about volunteering to shoulder the burden of civil commitment.”).  
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or some other form. Section 8 has long been understood to authorize Congress 
to mandate various actions by private individuals. Examples include requiring 
people to file a tax return,134 respond to the census and do so truthfully,135 
register for selective service,136 respond to a congressional subpoena,137 and 
report for jury duty.138 
Similarly, Section 8 grants Congress the power to impose a variety of other 
“individual mandates” in order to secure collective action. According to 
venerable constitutional understandings, Congress may require individuals to 
aid in civilian law enforcement, including enforcement of commerce power 
regulations;139 to purchase firearms and related gear in anticipation of service in 
the Militia;140 to turn gold currency in to the government in exchange for paper 
currency;141 and even to surrender their property,142 thereby removing 
obstructions to congressional regulation (or federal construction) of the 
channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce.143 
As a coherent response to numerous collective action problems, the clauses 
of Section 8 authorize Congress to compel action when using the grants of 
 
 134.  26 U.S.C. § 6012.  
 135.  13 U.S.C. § 221(a)–(b).  
 136.  50 U.S.C. app § 453.  
 137.  McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927). 
 138.  28 U.S.C. § 1866(g).  
 139.  Hall, supra note 52, at 1855 (discussing THE FEDERALIST NO. 29 (Hamilton) and a provision 
of the Judiciary Act of 1789). See 28 U.S.C. § 566(c) (“[T]he United States Marshals Service . . . shall 
command all necessary assistance to execute its duties.”). “This section is but the latest version of the 
authority first contained in § 27 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which itself merely reflected the common 
law rule that the sheriff had the power to summon the posse comitatus and that the citizen had the duty 
to participate if called upon.” Special Deputations of Private Citizens Providing Security to a Former 
Cabinet Member, 7 Op. O.L.C. 67, 69 (1983) (quoting the statement in In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, 535 
(1895), that “[i]t is the right, as well as the duty, of every citizen, when called upon by the proper 
officer, to act as part of the posse comitatus in upholding the laws of his country”); see also Federal 
Bureau of Investigation—Statutory Jurisdiction—Authority of Agents Concerning Non-Federal 
Offenses, 2 Op. O.L.C. 47, 50 (1978) (“At common law, a constable or sheriff had a right to summon 
bystanders to aid him in apprehending a felon, and those summoned were obliged to respond. This rule 
retains some vitality today . . . .”) (citation omitted); John Lenoir, The U.S. Marshals’ Posse: A Model 
for the 21st Century, 55 FED. LAWYER, Aug. 2008, at 34, 34–35 (observing that “Marshals’ authority to 
specially deputize a posse is derived from 28 USC § 566(c)”). The Marshals Service has long declined to 
require the assistance of private individuals due to concerns about the reliability of people who do not 
want the job. Conversation with Gerald Auerbach, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Marshals Serv. (May 2, 2011). 
Mr. Auerbach has been at the U.S.M.S. since 1973.  
 140.  Hall, supra note 52, at 1855–56 (discussing the Militia Act of 1792, which required “every free 
able-bodied white male citizen” between the ages of 18 and 45 to obtain at his own expense “a good 
musket or firelock, a sufficient bayonet and belt, two spare flints, and a knapsack, a pouch, with a box 
therein to contain not less than twenty four cartridges”). 
 141.  Id. at 1858 (quoting Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317, 328 (1935)). 
 142.  Without the power of eminent domain, the government—whether federal, state, or local—
might be unable to solve the holdout problem. For a discussion, see Cooter & Siegel, supra note 10, at 
139–44.  
 143.  Hall, supra note 52, at 1856 (observing that the Court has upheld congressional use of the 
eminent domain power “as a necessary and proper adjunct to the Commerce Clause, when used, for 
instance, to mandate the transfer of land for bridges, highways, or canals”) (citations omitted).  
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power in the enumerated list, including the commerce power. There is no basis 
for treating the Commerce Clause differently from other Section 8 powers. As 
Chief Justice Marshall explained for the Court in Gibbons v. Ogden,144 the 
commerce power is “the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by 
which commerce is to be governed.”145 Marshall, like the constitutional text he 
was construing, did not distinguish rule prescriptions that prohibit or permit 
action from rule prescriptions that compel action.146 According to the Marshall 
Court, “the power over commerce . . . among the several States, is vested in 
Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government.”147 Just as states 
may compel commercial action if they respect constitutional limits, so Congress 
may compel commercial action to address problems “among the several States” 
if Congress respects independent limits on its authority. 
Moreover, it seems ad hoc to diminish the pertinence of the above 
authorizations to issue individual mandates by labeling them fundamental 
duties of citizenship.148 The Constitution does not identify them as such or 
distinguish them on this ground; instead, the Constitution intermingles its 
licensing of federal taxation and military power with its authorization of federal 
regulation of other subjects that similarly implicate multi-state collective action 
problems. Nor is it evident why, from a federalism perspective, Congress should 
be empowered to overcome collective action problems facing the states by 
compelling activity with respect to fundamental duties of citizenship but not 
with respect to other serious societal problems that the states are unable to 
address effectively on their own. 
An illuminating example concerns the control of communicable diseases. 
Imagine that, in order to prevent the spread of a deadly disease across state 
lines, the federal government wanted to require individuals in affected areas to 
get vaccinated. In light of potentially large spillover effects impinging on the 
general welfare, Congress should have the power to mandate vaccination under 
Article I, Section 8 without first deciding whether vaccination qualifies as a 
fundamental duty of citizenship.149 Moreover, there is little doubt that the 
 
 144.  22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
 145.  Id. at 196. 
 146. As the father of two young children, I am required to regulate their behavior. I execute this 
responsibility by prohibiting them from doing certain things (for example, running in a parking lot), by 
permitting them to do certain things (for example, having a play date), and by requiring them to do 
certain things (for example, brushing their teeth and flossing). The requiremetns are no less regulatory 
than the permissions or prohibitions. 
 147.  Id. at 197.  
 148.  See Barnett, supra note 69, at 630 (arguing that the duties to “register for the draft and serve if 
called, sit on a jury, fill out a census form, and file a tax return” are not “imposed via Congress’s power 
to regulate economic behavior,” but instead “have traditionally been considered fundamental duties 
that each person owes to the government by virtue of American citizenship or residency”). 
 149.  Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 264(a) (2006) (authorizing the Secretary of Health and Human Services to 
make and enforce regulations necessary “to prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of 
communicable diseases from foreign countries into the States or possessions, or from one State or 
possession into any other State or possession”). For a discussion of this federal quarantine statute and 
related measures, see generally KATHLEEN S. SWENDIMAN & JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH 
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Supreme Court would uphold such congressional power, presumably under the 
Commerce Clause.150 The rationale for allowing federal regulation of this 
interstate externality under Section 8 is clear and powerful.151 
The above conclusions of collective action federalism are consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s use of the phrase “economic activity” in its contemporary 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The Court in Lopez, Morrison, and Raich 
used the phrase “economic activity” to describe typical objects of congressional 
regulation, such as the subject matter at issue in those three cases. The Court 
did not impose an actus reus requirement in commerce power litigation that 
ruled out omission regulability.152 Indeed, Lopez and Raich reaffirmed Wickard, 
which upheld a federal regulatory scheme that effectively required farmers to 
purchase wheat in the interstate market.153 The Wickard Court stated that 
“stimulation of commerce is a use of the regulatory function quite as definitely 
as prohibitions or restrictions thereon.”154 
In Wickard, Lopez, Morrison, and Raich, the Court focused decisively on 
the object of federal regulation to assess (1) whether it is fairly describable as 
“economic” in nature, and, in effect, (2) whether Congress reasonably could 
have determined that there is a collective action problem impeding federal 
regulation of interstate markets. Having “committed itself to sustaining federal 
 
SERV., RL 33201, FEDERAL AND STATE QUARANTINE AND ISOLATION AUTHORITY (2007), available 
at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33201.pdf 
 150.  Cf. SWENDIMAN & ELSEA, supra note 149, at 4 (“Federal quarantine authority derives from 
the Commerce Clause . . . .”). See Transcript of Oral Argument at 21–22, 30, United States v. 
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1939 (2010) (No. 08–1224): 
GENERAL KAGAN: [S]uppose that there was some very contagious form of drug-
resistant tuberculosis that had—had become prevalent in the prison system, and States 
were not able to deal with that, with quarantining these people upon their release date, 
and Congress said: You know, the best thing to do is to have the Federal Government act 
as the appropriate quarantining authority because we don’t think that States are able to 
step up and deal with this problem.  
Would anybody say that the Federal Government would not have Article I power to 
effect that kind of public safety measure? . . .  
JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, when I was thinking about your hypothetical, I thought, 
well, that’s a pretty easy commerce power argument. . . . 
JUSTICE SCALIA: We—we have a Federal agency that’s—that deals with 
communicable diseases. It’s part of the National Institute of Health, I believe. Is that 
agency ultra vires? I mean, aren’t communicable—I mean, if anything relates to interstate 
commerce, it’s communicable diseases, it seems to me. 
 151.  For an (unorthodox) argument that the General Welfare Clause might justify federal 
regulation in this circumstance, see Cooter & Siegel, supra note 10, at 178–79. 
 152.  See supra Part III (discussing two district court opinions that have in effect imposed such a 
requirement). 
 153.  Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129 (1942) (noting that farmers were “forc[ed] . . . into the 
market to buy what they could provide for themselves”); id. at 128–29 (concluding that “Congress may 
properly have considered that wheat consumed on the farm where grown if wholly outside the scheme 
of regulation would have a substantial effect in defeating and obstructing its purpose to stimulate trade 
therein at increased prices”). 
 154.  Id. at 128.  
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legislation on broad principles of economic practicality,”155 and underscoring 
“the importance of a practical conception of the commerce power,”156 the Court 
concluded in essence (albeit not explicitly) that Congress reasonably could have 
found such collective action problems in Wickard and Raich, but not in Lopez 
and Morrison.157 
V 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MINIMUM COVERAGE PROVISION 
A. The Commerce Clause Solution to Cost Shifting 
Part I of this article introduced the free rider problem of uncompensated 
care targeted by the ACA’s minimum coverage provision. This free rider 
problem causes a collective action problem for the states. In light of the 
economic nature and interstate scope of this collective action problem, the 
Commerce Clause justifies the minimum coverage provision. 
1. Noneconomic v. Economic 
In order for congressional regulation to be valid under the Commerce 
Clause in cases allegedly involving substantial effects on interstate commerce, 
Supreme Court precedent requires the object of the regulation to be 
“commercial” or “economic” in nature.158 The decision whether to purchase 
health insurance is “economic” in nature. Because the need for people to access 
healthcare services is inevitable, unpredictable, and potentially very costly,159 the 
decision whether to obtain health insurance is a decision about how to manage 
substantial financial risk. Financially able individuals who decline to purchase 
health insurance are making the economic decision to “go bare” with respect to 
the risk of serious injury or illness. 
There is a close analogy between the conduct of financially able individuals 
who decline to purchase health insurance and the decision to “go bare” in a 
business insurance setting.160 “Going bare” is a colloquial term in insurance law 
used to describe the conduct of a business enterprise that chooses to be 
uninsured, or severely underinsured, regarding a risk. For example, a physician 
may decide to go bare rather than pay the high cost of a medical malpractice 
 
 155.  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 571 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 156.  Id. at 572.  
 157.  See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 10, at 162–65 (analyzing the cases from a collective action 
perspective). 
 158.  See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (stressing the economic–noneconomic 
distinction); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (same); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549 (1995) (same).  
 159.  See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, The History and Future of Health Care Law: An Essentialist View, 41 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 347, 358 (2006) (considering “the essential features of health care delivery that 
distinguish its legal issues from those of other related fields,” and identifying as one of them “the high 
cost of care and wide variability of need, which necessitate public or private insurance that 
fundamentally alters medical economics”) (emphasis added). 
 160.  I thank my colleague Jonathan Wiener for informing me of the practice of “going bare.” 
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insurance policy.161 
An individual or enterprise that goes bare is understood to be making the 
economic decision to self-insure, relying either on personal financial resources 
or on the protections afforded by federal bankruptcy law in the event the risk 
materializes.162 Businesses that go bare are often viewed as engaging in a course 
of conduct that entails potentially high economic risk to themselves and 
others.163 If bankruptcy results, the costs associated with this financial risk will 
have to be paid by creditors. 
2. Inactivity v. Activity 
Critics of the minimum coverage provision emphasize that it regulates 
inactivity. According to these critics, the Supreme Court held in Lopez, 
Morrison, and Raich that Congress may regulate only “economic activity” using 
its commerce power.164 It follows, they reason, that Congress may not regulate 
inactivity using the Commerce Clause. To reiterate the Florida district court’s 
holding, “It would be a radical departure from existing case law to hold that 
Congress can regulate inactivity under the Commerce Clause.”165 
A key premise of critics of the minimum coverage provision is that 
constitutional analysis should focus on health insurance markets, not the 
healthcare market.166 If one focuses on health insurance markets, then the 
provision may seem to “regulate inactivity” or “compel an otherwise passive 
individual into a commercial transaction with a third party.”167 Individuals 
subject to the provision may be characterized as inactive in the sense that they 
do not presently participate in a health insurance market. The provision may be 
described as a regulation of inactivity in the sense that it requires such 
individuals to obtain health insurance coverage or pay a fee each year. 
 
 161.  See, e.g., Brian S. Kern, The Naked Truth Behind Going Bare (Jan. 31, 2011), 
http://mymedicalmalpracticeinsurance.com/news/?p=1442 (“Have you considered ‘going bare’—or 
without medical liability insurance?”) (sidenote).  
 162.  Rosie Cisneros, Malpractice Insurance Costs and Going Bare, LODMELL & LODMELL (June 8, 
2007, 11:39 AM), http://www.lodmell.com/malpractice-insurance-cost-going-bare (“Malpractice costs 
have become so expensive that more and more physicians are seeking alternatives wherever they can 
find them. Some are so angry and frustrated by soaring insurance premiums that they are going ‘bare,’ 
foregoing costly insurance—relying instead, in some cases, on the threat of bankruptcy to bail them out 
of any hefty patient claims. This is a risky choice, indeed.”). 
 163.  Id. (“Going ‘bare,’ especially when it comes to medical malpractice insurance, has never 
seemed advisable.”); Kern, supra note 161 (“At first glance, it might seem appealing: you would save a 
lot of money by not having to pay liability insurance premiums and you are a far less attractive 
malpractice target, as your pockets (and your practice’s) are significantly less deep than your insurance 
company’s pockets. But, upon closer look, it is almost never worth it.”) (sidenote). 
 164.  See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (“Gender-motivated crimes of 
violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity.”); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 
567 (1995) (“[P]ossession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, 
through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce.”). 
 165.  Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1286 (N.D. 
Fla. 2011). 
 166.  See Brief Amici Curiae of the American Hospital Association, supra note 8. 
 167.  Florida ex rel. Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1286. 
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Defenders of the minimum coverage provision object to the relatively 
narrow level of abstraction at which opponents characterize the object of 
congressional regulation. Defenders argue that Congress and the President 
were concerned about the healthcare market when they enacted the ACA.168 
Defenders observe that almost all Americans participate in this market.169 
Millions of individuals without health insurance—a significant percentage of 
whom can afford to purchase insurance—obtain billions of dollars’ worth of 
healthcare services each year and do not pay for them, shifting the costs to 
other participants in the healthcare market, including the federal and state 
governments.170 Defenders insist that consuming goods or services without 
paying is economic activity and that the minimum coverage provision seeks to 
regulate this activity. 
The above arguments of critics and defenders of the minimum coverage 
provision share the premise that it matters whether Congress is regulating 
inactivity, as opposed to activity, in relying on its commerce power. This 
premise is mistaken. The theory of collective action federalism explains why the 
distinction between inactivity and activity has nothing to do with the limits of 
the commerce power. 
3. Individual v. Collective Action 
There appears to be a broad legal consensus that no constitutionally 
protected rights are at stake in the litigation over the minimum coverage 
provision. Notwithstanding the rhetorical emphasis of opponents of the ACA 
on themes of individual liberty and freedom from coercion,171 most do not raise 
economic substantive due process objections to the minimum coverage 
provision, and those who do are rebuffed by otherwise sympathetic judges.172 
An implication of this consensus is that government at some level may require 
individuals to obtain health insurance coverage. The question is which level. 
The constitutional answer ought to turn on which level of government is 
best situated to address the free rider problem of uncompensated care that an 
insurance requirement is designed in part to alleviate. As explained in Part II, 
collective action problems include the free rider problems that unavoidably 
result once a society mandates access to healthcare in a medical emergency. 
Anyone can be grievously injured or fall ill at any moment; such injury or illness 
 
 168.  See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(A) (West 2011) (finding that the minimum coverage 
requirement regulates “economic and financial decisions about how and when health care is paid for”).  
 169.  See, e.g., Wendy K. Mariner & George J. Annas, Health Insurance Politics in Federal Court, 
363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1300, 1301 (2010) (“There are few nondiscretionary national markets in which 
virtually all Americans inevitably participate.”). 
 170.  See supra notes 47–53 and accompanying text (documenting these facts).  
 171.  For discussions, see generally Jedediah Purdy & Neil S. Siegel, The Liberty of Free Riders: The 
Minimum Coverage Provision, Mill’s “Harm Principle,” and American Social Morality, 38 AM. J.L. & 
MED. (forthcoming 2012); Bryan Leitch, Where Law Meets Politics: Freedom of Contract, Federalism, 
and the Fight over Health Care, 27 J.L. & POL. 177 (2011). 
 172.  See Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 
1161–62 (N.D. Fla. 2010). 
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can be ruinous financially,173 and almost all who are ill or grievously injured will 
end up at emergency rooms where they will expect to receive treatment 
regardless of whether they are insured.174 This is because the national political 
community is committed to providing stabilizing care for such people regardless 
of their ability to pay or insurance status. Federal law requires hospitals that 
participate in Medicare and offer emergency services—that is, almost all 
hospitals in the United States—to provide stabilizing care to patients who enter 
their emergency rooms while experiencing medical emergencies regardless of 
their ability to pay.175 This collective commitment is further reflected in state 
legislation and tort law,176 as well as in the longstanding mission of most 
hospitals in America to provide care to individuals who are unable to pay fully 
or at all.177 
When financially able individuals decline to purchase health insurance and 
then consume healthcare without paying in full, they free ride on 
benevolence.178 Free riding on benevolence can occur when people fail to insure 
against harm or reduce its probability and magnitude. The materialization of a 
risk generates claims by an unprepared victim on the benevolence of society, 
which is embodied in statutes and charitable social practices.179 People who have 
the means to purchase health insurance but decline may end up free riding on 
the federal and state governments, healthcare providers, insured individuals, or 
taxpayers. These participants in the healthcare system will pay much of the cost 
 
 173.  See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(G) (West 2011) (“[Sixty-two] percent of all personal 
bankruptcies are caused in part by medical expenses.”). 
 174.  See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of Economics Scholars in Support of Appellant, Virginia v. 
Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011) (Nos. 11-1057 & 11-1058) (“[T]he health care market is 
characterized by five unique factors—the unavoidable need for medical care; the unpredictability of 
such need; the high cost of care; the inability of providers to refuse to provide care in emergency 
situations; and the very significant cost-shifting that underlies the way medical care is paid for in this 
country—which do not obtain in other markets.”).  
 175.  Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd 
(2006).  
 176.  See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 42, Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (Nos. 11–1057 & 11–1058) (discussing 
state tort liability for failure to provide emergency care). 
 177.  See, e.g., CHARLES ROSENBERG, THE CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S 
HOSPITAL SYSTEM 347 (1995) (observing that “the hospital never assumed the guise of rational and 
rationalized economic actor during the first three-quarters of the twentieth century”; it “continued into 
the twentieth century, as it had begun in the eighteenth, to be clothed with public interest in a way that 
challenged categorical distinctions between public and private”; and “[p]rivate hospitals had always 
been assumed to serve the community at large—treating the needy”); id. at 352 (seeing “little prospect 
of hospitals in general becoming monolithic cost minimizers and profit maximizers,” and predicting that 
American society “will feel uncomfortable with a medical system that does not provide a plausible (if 
not exactly equal) level of care to the poor and socially isolated”). 
 178.  Cf. PHELPS, supra note 38, at 533 (noting that a solution to the free rider problem “of course, is 
to eliminate all laws requiring hospitals (and others) to treat those in need but without the means to 
pay for care, but our society appears unwilling to do this”; that “[u]nder current arrangements, 
hospitals (and others) must provide this care, and its costs are built into the prices charged to all paying 
customers”; and that “[c]reating universal insurance solves this problem because every citizen thereby 
is insured automatically, eliminating the free ride”). 
 179.  I thank Robert Cooter for his help in developing the concept of free riding on benevolence.  
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of medical treatment rather than let uninsured individuals—the beneficiaries of 
benevolence—go untreated.180 
The law can diminish free riding. To overcome risk taking in reliance on the 
benevolence of others, the law can require imprudent people to purchase health 
insurance.181 Free riding on benevolence provides a reason for action by 
government at some level.182 
To determine which level, the key constitutional question, as explained in 
Part IV, is whether the states are well situated to diminish free riding on 
benevolence by acting alone. The decisive inquiry, in other words, is captured 
by the distinction between individual and collective action by states, not the 
distinction between inactivity and activity. Free riders may be inactive in a 
market for the time being, but this inactivity itself may be a serious problem—
not a reason why Congress is powerless to offer a particularly effective solution. 
Using its commerce power, Congress may offer such a solution if the external 
costs imposed by free riders spill across state borders, thereby generating a 
collective action problem for the states. 
When the external costs imposed by free riders spill across state borders, 
one state is necessarily free riding on the benevolence of another state. There 
are two collective action problems at play: (1) a collective action problem 
involving individuals that disrespects state borders, and (2) a collective action 
problem involving states. These collective action problems are related. The 
collective action problem involving individuals causes the collective action 
problem involving states. For example, an uninsured individual in State A may 
go to State B for medical care, either temporarily or permanently, because the 
publicly financed care options in State A are less available or less generous. In 
this situation, the uninsured individual in State A is free riding on insured 
individuals in State B, and State A is free riding on State B by not providing 
public benefits sufficient to prevent an exodus of its own residents to State B. 
The same is true of many other interstate movements. 
 
 180.  Free riding by beneficiaries causes a second kind of free riding on benevolence—a race to the 
bottom among potential benefactors. This race occurs when people shift claims on their benevolence to 
others. For example, a wealthy individual who declines to contribute to medical care for the indigent 
free rides on the benevolence of others who will pay so that the poor receive care. This race to the 
bottom suggests that the demand for benevolence often will exceed the supply, resulting in too little 
benevolence. See, e.g., FAMILIES USA, supra note 53, at 4 (“We know that uninsured people often do 
not receive health care when they need it.”). 
 181.  To overcome attempts to shift the burdens of charity to others, the law can make everyone 
who is financially able contribute to helping others, such as by financing healthcare for the poor 
through a tax on income. Medicaid, for instance, avoids this race to the bottom. 
 182.  EMTALA might be viewed as a way in which Congress is bootstrapping its way into a 
collective action problem. Free riding on benevolence results not only from the failure of financially 
able individuals to obtain health insurance coverage but also from a federal statutory requirement to 
treat them. Part of the answer to this bootstrapping objection is that valid federal legislation provides a 
permissible baseline against which Congress may use its Section 8 powers. See infra notes 266, 267, 270–
272, and accompanying text (analyzing this issue). Another part of the answer is that EMTALA reflects 
a pervasive and longstanding commitment of American society, see, e.g., supra note 177, so that it is 
inaccurate to view Congress as determining the constitutional scope of its own authority. 
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Thus, whether the minimum coverage provision is within the scope of the 
Commerce Clause turns on whether a collective action problem exists “among 
the several States”183 or instead is internal to each state. Two pieces of evidence 
suggest that the free rider problem of uncompensated care—free riding on 
benevolence—exists among the states generally. 
First, it is well known that many insurance companies operate in multiple 
states.184 It likely follows that the scope of the problem of free riding on 
benevolence transcends state borders. When uninsured individuals obtain care 
without paying, the actors to whom they shift costs include providers, who raise 
their prices, and insurance companies, which raise the insurance premiums that 
individuals and families must pay.185 Because many of these insurance 
companies operate in multiple states, this cost shifting likely disrespects state 
boundaries.186 
To be sure, even in the post-ACA world, insurance pools and the regulation 
of insurance remain substantially state specific.187 States could impose 
regulations that prohibit multi-state insurers from shifting costs from out of 
state to their residents.188 Even so, the effects of cost shifting are unlikely to be 
state-contained. The overall capital reserves of insurance companies constitute 
a larger pool that undergirds all their market segments. Thus, just as market 
investments can hurt the overall financial health of insurers, so can poor loss 
ratios in one state hurt the ability of insurers to remain in more marginal 
markets in other states. Poor loss ratios in a particular state may stretch the 
overall reserves of insurance companies.189 Accordingly, the problem of 
uncompensated care in State A likely affects the premiums paid by individuals 
and families in State B when the same insurance company offers policies in both 
states.190 
Second, free riding on benevolence likely shifts costs across state lines 
because of interstate migration. It is empirically uncertain how frequently 
different state healthcare regimes cause interstate migrations of individuals on a 
 
 183.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 184.  See infra note 205 and accompanying text (documenting this fact).  
 185.  See supra notes 47–53, 170, and accompanying text (documenting these facts). 
 186.  Cf. Balkin, supra note 10, at 30 (reading the phrase “among the several states” in the 
Commerce Clause so that “Congress can regulate interactions that extend in their operation beyond the 
bounds of a particular state”) (emphasis added). 
 187.  In useful conversations, Abigail Moncrieff has pressed the argument to which I respond in the 
text. 
 188.  For example, a state could decline to approve premiums that are higher than necessary to 
cover their own residents. 
 189.  E-mail from Mark A. Hall, Professor of Law & Pub. Health, Wake Forest Univ. (Oct. 12, 
2011) (on file with author). 
 190.  Cf. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 541 (1944) (observing 
that insurance involves “a continuous and indivisible stream of intercourse among the states composed 
of collections of premiums, payments of policy obligations, and the countless documents and 
communications which are essential to the negotiation and execution of policy contracts”).  
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permanent basis.191 It is well documented, however, that residents of one state 
often move interstate temporarily to access needed medical care. For example, 
residents of southwestern Pennsylvania make more than 1,500 emergency room 
visits each year to a teaching hospital in West Virginia—the West Virginia 
University Hospital.192 Similarly, Harborview Medical Center in Seattle, which is 
run by the University of Washington, constitutes the only Level 1 Trauma 
Center for a region of the country that includes Washington, Alaska, Montana, 
and Idaho.193 “Uninsured individuals who suffer catastrophic injuries from 
accidents and other unpredictable events are transported to Harborview for the 
care it can uniquely provide. In 2009, Harborview cared for 12,028 patients from 
states in the region outside of Washington.”194 Likewise, healthcare providers in 
the nation’s capital, which “has made a heroic effort to insure all residents, treat 
thousands of residents from Maryland and Virginia, whose public insurance 
programs are far less generous.”195 It would be useful if future research could 
produce comprehensive data on cross-state hospital use in the United States. It 
would also be useful to know how many Americans live close to an interstate 
border.196 
The Supreme Court, in a famous “right to travel” case, recognized that 
different state healthcare regimes might encourage individuals to move 
interstate. In Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,197 the Court addressed a 
county’s concern that providing free medical care to indigents would encourage 
individuals from out of state to relocate to the county. The Court rejected this 
rationale for a one-year residency requirement, declaring a violation of the 
 
 191.  Andrew Koppelman cites a possible example: 
[T]he heavy burdens borne by Tennessee’s health care system may be related to the fact 
that its most populous city, Memphis, is bordered by Mississippi and Arkansas, which 
offer much lower benefits. TennCare insurers are also concerned that patients from other 
states may be establishing residency in Tennessee in order to obtain coverage for organ 
transplants. 
Andrew Koppelman, Bad News for Mail Robbers: The Obvious Constitutionality of Health Care 
Reform, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1, 16–17 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/981.pdf (citing, 
inter alia, WILLIAM M. MERCER INC., EVALUATION OF CRITICAL ISSUES FACING THE TENNCARE 
PROGRAM—REPORT 9 (1999)). This report wondered “if providers in these bordering states are 
encouraging patients to relocate to Tennessee in order to access TennCare.” Id.  
 192.  Amicus Brief on Behalf of the Governors of Washington, Colorado, Michigan, and 
Pennsylvania in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 9, Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (No. 3:10–cv–91–RV/EMT). 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  Sara Rosenbaum, Can States Pick Up the Health Reform Torch?, NEW ENG. J. MED., (Feb. 25, 
2010), http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1001439.  
 196.  True, states end up bearing some of the costs when their residents access healthcare in other 
states for which they do not pay. For example, when a New Hampshire resident cannot pay off a large 
debt to a Massachusetts hospital, the resident may have to declare bankruptcy, and many of the costs 
associated with bankruptcy will stay in New Hampshire. But this just means that New Hampshire’s free 
riding is not entirely free. New Hampshire is still paying less than the full cost of the conduct of its 
resident because the hospital’s uncompensated costs stay in Massachusetts. Moreover, many of the 
resident’s creditors may not be in New Hampshire. 
 197.  415 U.S. 250 (1974). 
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fundamental right to travel. Notably, however, the Court did not dispute the 
factual premise of interstate migration. Instead, the Court seemed to accept its 
validity but deemed it constitutionally irrelevant to the scope of the individual 
right at issue.198 “An indigent who considers the quality of public hospital 
facilities in entering the State,” the Court wrote, “is no less deserving than one 
who moves into the State in order to take advantage of its better educational 
facilities.”199 Thus the Court in 1974 took seriously the concern that people may 
migrate to obtain better healthcare. In view of advancements in technology, 
communication, and transportation over the past thirty-eight years, it is more 
likely that such interstate migrations occur today. Moreover, the right to travel 
would prohibit states from preventing individuals from moving into the state 
and taking advantage of its more generous healthcare benefits. 
B. The Commerce–Sweeping Clause Solution to Adverse Selection 
Just as the minimum coverage provision responds to the two free rider 
problems identified in Part II (cost shifting and adverse selection), so there are 
at least two sources of congressional power in Article I, Section 8 that support 
the provision.200 In addition to being within the scope of the commerce power 
standing alone, the minimum coverage provision is independently justified by 
the Commerce Clause in combination with the Necessary and Proper Clause 
(also called the Sweeping Clause).201 There is a straightforward argument that 
the provision is necessary and proper for carrying into execution the ACA’s 
commerce power regulations of the health insurance industry, thereby 
ameliorating the adverse-selection problem that undermines health insurance 
markets.  
No one disputes that the commerce power supports the ACA provisions 
that prohibit insurance companies from denying coverage based on preexisting 
conditions, canceling insurance, discriminating based on medical history, and 
imposing lifetime benefit limits.202 The Court has long held that Congress may 
use the Commerce Clause to regulate insurance markets. “Perhaps no modern 
commercial enterprise directly affects so many persons in all walks of life as 
does the insurance business,” wrote the Court in 1944.203 “This business,” the 
Court continued, “is not separated into forty-eight distinct territorial 
compartments which function in isolation from each other. Interrelationship, 
 
 198.  Id. at 263–67. 
 199.  Id. at 264. 
 200.  This article does not address whether the tax power, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 
independently justifies the minimum coverage provision. For an affirmative answer, see generally 
Cooter & Siegel, supra note 69.  
 201.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 202.  42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300gg, 300gg-1(a), 300gg-3(a), 300gg-11, 300gg-12 (West 2011).  
 203.  United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 540 (1944) (“Insurance 
touches the home, the family, and the occupation or the business of almost every person in the United 
States.”); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(3) (West 2011) (citing South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n as 
authority for the proposition that “insurance is interstate commerce subject to Federal regulation”). 
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interdependence, and integration of activities in all states in which they operate 
are practical aspects of the insurance companies’ methods of doing business.”204 
The theory of collective action federalism endorses this doctrinal conclusion 
because different state regulations of insurance companies can cause collective 
action problems. The theoretical rationale for this proposition begins with the 
reality of a robust interstate healthcare market in a nation consisting of 
demilitarized borders among the states. Insurance companies are mobile 
(meaning they can pull up stakes) and often conduct business in several or 
many states.205 Private healthcare providers are also potentially mobile, as are 
many unhealthy and healthy individuals. The combination of open interstate 
borders and potentially mobile participants in the healthcare market means that 
the states are likely to get in one another’s way—they are likely to impose 
significant costs on one another without paying for them—when one or more 
states enact healthcare reforms on their own, including by guaranteeing access 
to health insurance and imposing a minimum coverage provision to combat free 
riding within their jurisdictions. 
Imagine, for example, that a state (call it M) imposes a minimum coverage 
provision and prohibits insurance companies from denying individuals coverage 
based on preexisting medical conditions. In addition, imagine that State M helps 
residents to obtain insurance through a series of tax credits and subsidies, and 
through a requirement that private employers provide a certain level of 
healthcare to their employees. 
Now consider what will likely happen. Because most states today allow 
health insurance companies to deny coverage or charge higher premiums based 
on preexisting conditions,206 some number of unhealthy individuals are likely to 
move into State M.207 Moreover, some number of healthy individuals may move 
out and relocate in medically underwritten states, especially if they work in 
industries that employ younger, highly skilled labor such as the computer 
industry. (The number of people moving interstate likely will depend in part on 
 
 204.  South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. at 541. 
 205.  See § 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(B) (West 2011) (“[M]ost health insurance is sold by national 
or regional health insurance companies . . . .”); Hall, supra note 52, at 1845 (“[T]he insurance markets 
in many states are dominated by insurers owned by large national firms.”) (citations omitted); see, e.g., 
Aetna, MAPS OF WORLD, http://finance.mapsofworld.com/company/aetna.html (“Aetna [Health 
Insurance] operates in all 50 states . . . .”). 
 206.  DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., COVERAGE DENIED: HOW THE CURRENT HEALTH 
INSURANCE SYSTEM LEAVES MILLIONS BEHIND 1 (2009) (“In 45 states across the country, insurance 
companies can discriminate against people based on their pre-existing conditions when they try to 
purchase health insurance directly from insurance companies in the individual insurance market. 
Insurers can deny them coverage, charge higher premiums, and/or refuse to cover that particular 
medical condition.”); id. (“A recent national survey estimated that 12.6 million non-elderly adults—36 
percent of those who tried to purchase health insurance directly from an insurance company in the 
individual insurance market—were in fact discriminated against because of a pre-existing condition in 
the previous three years.”). 
 207.  Although sick entrants will have to obtain health insurance coverage and pay premiums, they 
will still be free riding on individuals who obtained coverage when they were healthy. The premiums 
that sick entrants pay will be lower than the cost of care they will require. 
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the size of the exaction imposed by State M for going without insurance.) In 
addition, some number of insurers in State M will likely move to states that do 
not prohibit coverage denials based on preexisting conditions.208 
Now consider the likely effects on individual workers and firms. Residents 
of State M with health problems may find it difficult to relocate to states that 
offer less generous healthcare benefits, even to pursue better work 
opportunities. Healthy residents of other states may be disinclined to relocate 
to State M if doing so means having to purchase health insurance or pay a fee. 
Out-of-state firms may be disinclined to move to State M if doing so will raise 
the cost of their healthcare obligations to employees. 
All of these interstate movements (or immobility) are not mere interstate 
effects. They are spillover effects (interstate externalities) because they impose 
unpriced costs or benefits on the residents (or treasuries) of different states. For 
instance, when sick individuals migrate to State M just because State M 
prohibits insurance companies from denying coverage based on preexisting 
conditions, more financial pressure is placed on State M’s healthcare system. 
The risk pool is now occupied by higher-cost insureds; insurance premiums 
likely will rise for everyone already in the system; the exaction for going 
without insurance may have to increase to induce more healthy people to enter 
the risk pool; and state taxes may need to increase, either to subsidize the 
acquisition of healthcare for those who cannot afford to buy insurance or to pay 
the costs of emergency care for uninsured individuals. The states from which 
the sick migrants come do not pay for any of the costs imposed on State M as a 
result of the migration,209 even though the existence of comparatively less 
attractive healthcare regimes in these states caused the migration.210 
The interstate scope of the collective action problem might be more obvious 
if, say, the State of Florida attempted to run the scheme described above and 
northern states determined that they could reduce budgetary pressures by 
paying their indigent senior citizens to relocate in Florida. “The existence of 
such a system” would become “a bait to the needy and dependent elsewhere, 
 
 208.  See Rosenbaum, supra note 195 (“Even if individual states are willing to intervene, insurers 
are free to evade state regulation simply by pulling up stakes in any jurisdiction with an unappealing 
political and regulatory climate.”).  
 209.  See, e.g., Brian Galle, The Taxing Power, the Affordable Care Act, and the Limits of 
Constitutional Compromise, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 407, 411–12 (2011), 
http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/971.pdf (arguing that “[t]he structure of health care produces a 
race to the bottom that diminishes state autonomy” because “some states provide care for the 
uninsured,” which “creates a cross-border moral hazard, allowing neighboring states to offer fewer free 
services but permitting citizens of the low-service states to cross the border when they fall ill”); id. 
(observing that “the pressure on each state is to free ride on the efforts of its neighbors” because 
“states that offer better services attract migrants that drive up prices, taxes, or both”).  
 210.  It is not true, as certain of my interlocutors have urged, that federal power is limitless if it is 
ever justified “merely” by interstate migration in response to different state regulatory regimes. To 
justify federal intervention, the amount of migration at issue may not be trivial. For example, the 
phenomenon of “job lock” in response to different state healthcare regimes is well documented. See, 
e.g., JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 424 (2d ed. 2007) (finding that 
“workers with health insurance are about 25% less likely to change jobs because of that insurance”).  
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encouraging them to migrate and seek a haven of repose.”211 Even where the 
external costs are less obvious, states may still face difficulties in attempting to 
overcome the collective action problem on their own. “Only a power that is 
national can serve the interests of all.”212 
Evidence past and present supports many of the theoretical predictions 
offered above. Historically, progressive legislation passed by one state or region 
sometimes gave an advantage to other states or regions in interstate economic 
competition. For example, there is a well-understood connection between 
Progressive Era reform and manufacturing capital flight from the Northeast and 
Midwest to the South. During the late nineteenth century and early twentieth 
century, northern states were enacting progressive labor laws while southern 
states imposed few legal constraints.213 (The Supreme Court’s key invalidations 
of federal child labor legislation, enacted in part to counteract the race to the 
bottom, arose out of North Carolina.214) One consequence of this divergence in 
state laws was a movement of economic enterprises from the North to the 
South. 
One contemporaneous commentator, Edward Porritt, discussed the 
relationship between labor progressivism and capital flight in the context of 
textile looms moving southwards.215 Writing in 1896, Mr. Porritt observed that 
“[t]he greatest emphasis is laid by the [New England] manufacturers on the fact 
that there are no labor laws worth speaking about in the South.”216 One 
manufacturer confessed that he did 
not care whether the working day is ten hours or nine hours, provided it is made 
the same for everybody. Then we would all stand on one level. But now the man 
in the South is not afraid of legislation, because it comes to him last. The man 
who is afraid is the man to whom legislation comes first; he is the man who has 
 
 211.  Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 644 (1937) (upholding the Social Security Act’s old-age 
pension program).  
 212.  Id. For a discussion of the collective action reasoning in Helvering and Steward Mach. Co. v. 
Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937), see Cooter & Siegel, supra note 10, at 168–69. 
 213.  See, e.g., Philip M. Holleran, Family Income and Child Labor in Carolina Cotton Mills, 21 SOC. 
SCI. HIST. 297, 301 (1997) (focusing “on mill families in North Carolina and South Carolina, where 
child labor and the family labor system were most deeply entrenched”); id. (“The two states ranked 
second and first, respectively, in the nation in employment of children in cotton mills from 1899 
through 1914.”). 
 214.  See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (invalidating a federal ban on the shipment in 
interstate commerce of goods produced by child labor); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor 
Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (invalidating a federal excise “tax” on the net profits of employers that 
employed children based on a distinction between impermissible “regulatory” and permissible 
“revenue raising” exactions). 
 215.  Edward Porritt, The Cotton Mills in the South, 18 NEW ENG. MAG. 575, 575 (1896) (“Not a 
little New England capital has already been invested in some of the new southern [cotton 
manufacturing] enterprises; and in Massachusetts especially there has been much discussion, both 
among mill owners and among working men, of the conditions of manufacture and labor in the South, 
as affecting a possible large transfer thither of the cotton industries of the North.”). I thank Ed 
Balleison for this reference. 
 216.  Id. at 578. 
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to carry the load.
217
 
Northern states paid a price for their (relative) humanity. They suffered 
financially by putting businesses that initially were located there at a 
competitive disadvantage relative to businesses in the South.218 Mr. Porritt 
concluded his remarkable account by observing that the states would not 
address the collective action problem on their own any time soon:  
At the present time, when southern cotton mills are driving as hard as they can 
go, and the South is in the enjoyment of a new prosperity, the southern cotton 
states would be even less disposed to go into an interstate conference than were 
some of the European nations to discuss international labor problems at the 
suggestion of the Emperor of Germany.
219
 
Fast forwarding to the present, it is well known that the general welfare 
suffers when individuals decline better job opportunities in another state 
because they cannot afford the loss of health insurance benefits they would 
suffer if they moved.220 Health economists call this phenomenon “job lock.”221 
Moreover, it is well documented that numerous insurers moved to other states 
when their home state banned coverage denials based on preexisting conditions. 
For example, almost every insurer left the state when Kentucky passed reform 
legislation; only one private insurer and one state-run insurer remained.222 
Insurers also left Washington,223 New York,224 and several other states.225 
 
 217.  Id.  
 218.  See, e.g., HUGH D. HINDMAN, CHILD LABOR: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 59 (2002) (observing 
that Massachusetts was no longer the most progressive state on child labor matters after 1900 because it 
was “[t]ied so heavily to the textile industry, the tremendous growth of the industry in the South 
presented a competitive menace,” and “part of the South’s competitive advantage derived from 
pervasive child labor,” so that “Massachusetts found itself unable to continue advancing its child labor 
standards without harm to industrial interests”); STEPHEN B. WOOD, CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN 
THE PROGRESSIVE ERA: CHILD LABOR AND THE LAW 9 (1968) (noting the charge of “northern 
manufacturers,” including “the New England textile industry,” that “the south’s competitive advantage 
resulted principally from the exploitation of children and the consequent depressed scale of adult 
wages,” and concluding that “[t]his explanation was close to the truth”).  
 219.  Porritt, supra note 215, at 586. Of course, interstate capital migration did not end with the 
Progressive Era. For example, Jefferson Cowie offers a rich comparative social history of industrial 
relocation from the 1930s to the 1990s. He chronicles one major corporation’s migrations from the 
Northeast to the Midwest, then to the South, and finally to Mexico in search of stable, cheap, and 
pliable labor. See generally JEFFERSON COWIE, CAPITAL MOVES: RCA’S SEVENTY-YEAR QUEST FOR 
CHEAP LABOR (1999). 
 220.  See, e.g., Rosenbaum, supra note 195, at e29(3) (“[I]n a modern economy, people need to be 
able to move interstate in order to pursue economic opportunities and participate in a changing labor 
market.”); cf. Cooter & Siegel, supra note 10, at 149 (“In the eighteenth century, America faced the 
problem of creating a unified market for goods, capital, and labor. Legal obstacles to the movement of 
resources inhibit national markets. In contrast, a uniform regulatory framework lubricates national 
markets for some goods.”). 
 221.  See, e.g., PHELPS, supra note 38, at 324–25. Congress attempted to address the matter in the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–191, 110 Stat. 1936. 
 222.  See Adele M. Kirk, Riding the Bull: Experience with Individual Market Reform in Washington, 
Kentucky, and Massachusetts, 25 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 133 (2000). 
 223.  Id.  
 224.  Mark A. Hall, An Evaluation of New York’s Reform Law, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & LAW 
71 (2000).  
 225.  See infra note 250 (discussing surveys reporting similar results of healthcare reform in several 
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These states, however, did not impose a minimum coverage provision, and 
Congress found that Massachusetts has been substantially more successful in 
preventing an exodus of insurers by imposing one.226 The question is whether 
other states would be able to enact similar healthcare legislation—and if not, 
why not? Does the apparent success of Massachusetts in achieving near-
universal coverage without causing insurers to leave demonstrate that the 
interstate spillover effects are modest at best, such that states can “go it alone” 
without incurring prohibitive costs? 
There are several reasons to believe that few states could achieve what 
Massachusetts achieved. Some of these reasons do not appear attributable to 
the existence of sister states.227 They include the relatively low number of 
uninsured residents in Massachusetts when it enacted reform. Only 9% of its 
residents were uninsured when the state adopted universal coverage in 2006 
compared with 15% in the nation as a whole today.228 Moreover, Massachusetts 
had a relatively healthy economy and ample financial resources when it acted.229 
By contrast, Texas and California together were home to 12.7 million uninsured 
individuals in 2008, and their financial resources are severely constrained.230 In 
addition, healthcare costs in Massachusetts are continuing to rise.231 For 
example, “per capita spending on health care in Massachusetts is 15% higher 
than in the rest of the nation, even when accounting for the state’s wages and 
spending on medical research and education.”232 
Federalism problems may also be impeding other states from attempting to 
replicate the Massachusetts experiment. Strikingly, Massachusetts is the only 
state that has succeeded in passing healthcare reform legislation that shares the 
basic objectives and approaches of the ACA. (Contrast this situation with the 
 
states). 
 226.  42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(D) (West 2011) (“In Massachusetts, a similar requirement has 
strengthened private employer-based coverage: despite the economic downturn, the number of workers 
offered employer-based coverage has actually increased.”); see Amitabh Chandra et al., The 
Importance of the Individual Mandate—Evidence from Massachusetts, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 293, 295 
(2011) (offering evidence suggesting that the Massachusetts “mandate had a causal role in improving 
risk selection”). 
 227.  See, e.g., Rosenbaum, supra note 195 (“Today, between the surging numbers of uninsured, 
collapsing state economies, and a decided shift in the culture and politics of government intervention, 
another Massachusetts is out of the question.”). 
 228.  LANDMARK, supra note 39, at 90.  
 229.  Rosenbaum, supra note 195 (“Massachusetts must be understood as the rarity rather than the 
norm.”).  
 230.  Id. 
 231.  “Massachusetts is grappling with escalating health care costs which are consuming a greater 
portion of the economy and lowering real wage growth.” STANLEY S. WALLACK ET AL., 
MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH CARE COST TRENDS PART I: THE MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH CARE 
SYSTEM IN CONTEXT: COSTS, STRUCTURE, AND METHODS USED BY PRIVATE INSURERS TO PAY 
PROVIDERS (February 2010), http://www.mass.gov/eohhs/docs/dhcfp/r/cost-trends-files/part1-system-in-
context.pdf. 
 232.  DIV. OF HEALTH CARE FIN. & POLICY, MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH CARE COST TRENDS: 
2010 FINAL REPORT (April 2010), http://www.mass.gov/eohhs/docs/dhcfp/cost-trend-docs/final-report-
docs/health-care-cost-trends-2010-final-report.pdf.  
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more than forty states that had enacted laws banning guns in schools when 
Congress passed the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990.233) The explanation 
for this state of affairs is not lack of political support for the ACA in every state 
except Massachusetts. The ACA was no bolt from the blue. The President (like 
his Democratic rivals for the 2008 presidential nomination) campaigned on 
healthcare reform, and the ACA was approved by well more than a majority 
(albeit a partisan majority) of the Senate.234 Moreover, the nation remains 
divided over the law. A March 2012 poll found that, “[o]f those who say they 
understand the law, 45 percent approve and 51 percent oppose.”235 In all 
likelihood, part of the explanation for the current situation at the state level is 
that the federalism problems associated with state-by-state solutions are 
significant—and are perceived by state legislators to be significant.236 
To fully answer the question, however, further information about what is 
going on in Massachusetts would be helpful. The theory of collective action 
federalism directs research towards the question whether healthcare reform in 
Massachusetts has been causing migration to and from the state by healthy 
individuals, sick individuals, insurers, and providers.237 There presently do not 
exist good data on mobility in and out of Massachusetts caused by the state’s 
legislative efforts.238 Opponents of the ACA would be well served if they could 
show that spillover effects and free riding by sister states have not been 
substantially undermining the efficacy of Massachusetts’s own attempt to 
 
 233.  See supra note 128 and accompanying text (quoting Justice Kennedy’s legislative count in 
Lopez). 
 234.  The ACA received 60 votes in the Senate (58 Democrats, 2 Independents). See Senate Vote on 
Passage: H.R. 3590 [111th]: Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, GOVTRACK.US, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/vote.xpd?vote=s2009-396. The vote in the House of Representatives 
was 219 to 212. See House Vote #165 (Mar. 21, 2010), GOVTRACK.US, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/vote.xpd?vote=h2010-165. The House vote was so close in part 
because of the opposition of some Democrats to the Senate healthcare bill, on which the House was 
voting. These Democrats wanted the bill to include tighter limits on insurance coverage for abortions. 
See David M. Herszenhorn & Robert Pear, Democrats Rally to Obama’s Call for Health Vote, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 21, 2010, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res= 
9904E5DC1039F932A15750C0A9669D8B63&pagewanted=all.  
 235.  Dalia Sussman, Helene Cooper & Kate Phillips, Most Oppose at Least Part of Overhaul, Poll 
Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/27/us/most-americans-
want-health-care-law-overturned-or-changed-poll-finds.html?_r=2&sq=health. 
 236.  See Koppelman, supra note 191, at 17–18 (arguing that the factual uncertainty about the 
existence and scope of a race to the bottom is part of the collective action problem).  
 237.  Cf. Cooter & Siegel, supra note 10, at 154 (calling for extensive fact finding on the scope of 
public goods, externalities, and markets). 
 238.  E-mail from Jonathan Gruber, Professor of Econ., Mass. Inst. of Techn. (Apr. 26, 2011) (on 
file with author). The present size of the exaction in Massachusetts—roughly $1,000, see LANDMARK, 
supra note 39, at 91—may be too small to be causing relatively young and healthy individuals to leave 
the state who would otherwise stay. Other expenses, like relative local tax burdens, may be more 
significant to an individual’s financial calculation, yet also may not cause substantial flight in light of all 
the other reasons (such as job opportunities and family ties) that determine an individual’s place of 
residency. By the same token, the modest size of the Massachusetts exaction for noncompliance may be 
causing older, unhealthy individuals to move to the state. Only time (and research) will tell. If it turns 
out that there is little in-migration of sick people, part of the explanation may be that Medicare and 
Medicaid already solve the worst of the federalism problem.  
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provide universal access to healthcare. Defenders of the ACA would be well 
served if they could show the opposite.239 
This available evidence, however, makes out a reasonably strong prima facie 
case for federal regulation—at least as strong as what one usually encounters to 
justify use of the commerce power.240 Accordingly, the commerce power 
supports the ACA’s effort to broaden the availability of health insurance by 
imposing specific terms on health insurance contracts sold throughout the 
country. The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power “to govern affairs 
which the individual states, with their limited territorial jurisdictions, are not 
fully capable of governing.”241 
Notably, constitutional critics of the ACA do not tend to argue that 
preventing insurers from denying coverage to people is best left for the states to 
address on an individual basis. For example, Tea Party activists who issued the 
“Contract from America” called for replacing the ACA “with a system that 
actually makes health care and health insurance more affordable by enabling a 
competitive, open, and transparent free-market health care and health 
insurance system that isn’t restricted by state boundaries.”242 It is not evident how 
the states acting individually possess either the authority or the ability to 
accomplish this result. Unlike in past constitutional litigation over guns in 
schools, violence against women, and medical marijuana, the opponents of the 
federal law do not attempt to explain how, if a state or local government 
“determines that [insurance market reforms] are necessary and wise to deter 
 
 239.  A 2005 Report of the Inspector General of Massachusetts may suggest problems with out-of-
state residents using the state’s more generous healthcare system. The report examines the 
Massachusetts safety net pool prior to the 2007 reforms. The state’s Uncompensated Care Pool 
“provides reimbursement to hospitals, hospital-based clinics, and community health centers for 
providing free or partially-subsidized medical services to uninsured or underinsured patients.” OFFICE 
OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., ONGOING REVIEW OF THE UNCOMPENSATED 
CARE POOL PURSUANT TO CHAPTER 240 OF THE ACTS OF 2004: SECOND REPORT TO THE HOUSE 
AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 1 (Nov. 2005), available at 
http://www.mass.gov/ig/publ/poolrpt.pdf. Although the report does not specifically find abuse from out 
of state, it does identify problems with the documentation of the residency status of claimants: 
The audit firm contracted by the Inspector General reviewed Uncompensated Care Pool 
claims, comparing the address on the application with the backup documentation 
provided to the hospital as required by pool regulations. Documents proving residency 
include copies of drivers’ licenses, utility bills, pay stubs, voter identification cards, and 
affidavits. . . . For hospital fiscal years 2003, 2004, and the first five months of 2005, the 
auditors found that 12.9 percent, 5.5 percent, and 6.4 percent respectively of the claims 
tested lacked adequate documentation supporting residency status. 
Id. at 49–50. 
 240.  In Raich, for example, Justice O’Connor disagreed with the deference exhibited by the Court 
in upholding federal power to regulate medical marijuana use authorized by state law. She conceded 
that the Court’s “arguments about the effect of the [California law] on the national market . . . are 
plausible; if borne out in fact they could justify prosecuting [state] patients under the federal CSA.” But 
she insisted that “without substantiation, they add little to the CSA’s conclusory statements.” Gonzales 
v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 56–57 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 241.  United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 525 (1944).  
 242.  THE CONTRACT FROM AMERICA, http://www.contractfromamerica.com/Idea.aspx (emphasis 
added). 
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[insurers from denying people coverage], the reserved powers of the States are 
sufficient to enact those measures.”243 This may be because “[s]tates have had 
decades to enact broad reforms, yet the record has been one of futility despite 
enormous effort.”244 The states may be too interdependent for each one to solve 
the problem on its own.  
Although Congress had the authority to enact the ACA’s restrictions of 
insurance companies, it would have been foolish to pass them without also 
enacting the minimum coverage provision. Insurance companies may not be 
financially viable if the law denies them the capacity to control costs through 
coverage restrictions without preventing market timing behavior.245 As Congress 
found, “[I]f there were no [coverage] requirement, many individuals would wait 
to purchase health insurance until they needed care.”246 
As explained in Part II, this adverse-selection problem occurs when 
individuals with higher expected healthcare costs are more likely to purchase 
insurance than individuals with lower expected costs. The market for health 
insurance attracts adverse selection, even absent the ACA’s restrictions on 
insurers but especially with them, because individuals know more about their 
health status than insurance companies do.247 This information asymmetry 
creates an incentive for individuals to free ride by entering the market only 
when they expect to require expensive care. The minimum coverage provision 
is designed in part to combat this free rider problem.248 The predicted 
consequence of the adverse-selection problem absent an insurance requirement 
is a substantial rise in insurance rates.249 Much empirical evidence confirms this 
 
 243.  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 244.  Rosenbaum, supra note 195.  
 245.  See Brief for America’s Health Insurance Plans, supra note 54, at 3 (“Without an individual 
mandate requirement, more individuals will make the rational economic decision to wait to purchase 
coverage until they expect to need health care services. If imposed without an individual mandate 
provision, the market reform provisions would reinforce this ‘wait-and-see’ approach by allowing 
individuals to move in and out of the market as they expect to need coverage, undermining the very 
purpose of insurance to pool and spread risk.”).  
 246.  42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(I) (West 2011). Congress further found that “[b]y significantly 
increasing health insurance coverage, the requirement, together with the other provisions of this Act, 
will minimize this adverse selection and broaden the health insurance risk pool to include healthy 
individuals, which will lower health insurance premiums,” and that “[t]he requirement is essential to 
creating effective health insurance markets in which improved health insurance products that are 
guaranteed issue and do not exclude coverage of preexisting conditions can be sold.” Id; see also id. § 
18091(a)(2)(J) (“The requirement is essential to creating effective health insurance markets that do not 
require underwriting and eliminate its associated administrative costs.”). 
 247.  See PHELPS, supra note 38, at 318 (noting the “risk . . . that insurance companies will put an 
insurance plan into the market that uses one set of actuarial projections about the costs of insured 
people but ends up attracting a special subset of the population with unusually high health care costs”). 
 248.  See id. at 533 (describing the market failure resulting from asymmetric information as 
“[p]erhaps the most substantial argument for universal insurance”). For the classic article on 
asymmetric information, which earned its author the Nobel Prize in Economics, see George A. 
Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 
(l970). 
 249.  See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTS OF ELIMINATING THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE TO 
OBTAIN HEALTH INSURANCE 2 (June 16, 2010) (predicting a 15 to 20% increase in premiums for new 
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prediction.250 Because of the close connection between the minimum coverage 
provision and the ACA provisions that restrict insurers, the Necessary and 
Proper Clause offers a strong constitutional justification for the provision.251  
One federal court that invalidated the provision erred in asserting that “[i]f 
a person’s decision not to purchase health insurance at a particular point in time 
does not constitute the type of economic activity subject to regulation under the 
Commerce Clause, then logically an attempt to enforce such provision under 
the Necessary and Proper Clause is equally offensive to the Constitution.”252 
From McCulloch v. Maryland253 to United States v. Comstock,254 the Supreme 
Court has understood the Sweeping Clause differently. It has understood the 
clause to authorize Congress to employ means that are otherwise outside the 
scope of Section 8 in order to achieve regulatory objectives that are within the 
scope of Section 8 (or some other part of the Constitution).255 This is why, under 
a Necessary and Proper Clause rationale, it does not matter whether the 
minimum coverage provision itself solves a collective action problem facing the 
states.256 To be authorized by the Sweeping Clause, it suffices that the provision 
is a useful adjunct to the commerce-power regulations of the insurance industry, 
which do solve collective action problems for the states. 
Critics might respond that if the minimum coverage provision were held 
 
nongroup policies relative to current law absent the mandate); Bradley Herring, An Economic 
Perspective on the Individual Mandate’s Severability from the ACA, NEW ENG. J. MED. (Feb. 23, 2011), 
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMpv1101519 (noting the estimation of MIT economist 
Jonathan Gruber that only eight million people (instead of thirty-two million) would join the ranks of 
the insured if the ACA had no mandate); Brief for America’s Health Insurance Plans, supra note 54, at 
13–15 (“[T]he common theme in the economic and actuarial literature is that premiums increase and 
coverage rates fall when insurance market reforms are enacted without an individual mandate.”). 
 250.  Rosenbaum & Gruber, supra note 53, at 403 (“Five states have tried to undertake reforms . . . 
without enacting an individual mandate; those five states are now among the eight states with the most 
expensive nongroup health insurance.”); Brief for America’s Health Insurance Plans, supra note 54, at 
15–26 (surveying the experience of Maine, New Jersey, Kentucky, New Hampshire, Washington, New 
York, Vermont, and Massachusetts in passing reform legislation without a mandate and finding a 
common trend of “destabilization of individual markets, increases in premiums, and declines in 
enrollment”). 
 251.  One could also invoke the comprehensive regulatory scheme rationale of Lopez and Raich. 
See supra note 127 and accompanying text (quoting the majority opinion in Lopez). 
 252.  Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 779 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
 253.  17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405–07, 421 (1819). 
 254.  130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956–58 (2010). 
 255.  For example, in Comstock the Justices debated the standard of review courts should apply to 
federal legislation that is defended as resting on the Necessary and Proper Clause. The majority, 
consisting of Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, stated that 
“in determining whether the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the legislative authority to 
enact a particular federal statute, we look to see whether the statute constitutes a means that is 
rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power.” Id. at 1956 (citation 
omitted). By contrast, Justice Kennedy would insist on “a demonstrated link in fact, based on empirical 
demonstration.” Id. at 1967 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Alito seemed to endorse 
Justice Kennedy’s more demanding standard. Id. at 1970 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment). 
 256.  Once Congress prohibits the underwriting practices of insurers, each state has an incentive to 
impose a minimum coverage provision (or to search for an effective substitute) in order to prevent 
insurers from moving to sister states that require residents to possess health insurance. 
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unconstitutional, Congress could try to combat the adverse-selection problem in 
other ways. For example, Congress could provide higher subsidies to tempt 
healthier individuals into the insurance pool.257 Congress, however, could always 
spend more money on a problem, including by guaranteeing every American 
free and comprehensive access to healthcare and raising taxes to finance the 
program. The proper constitutional inquiry does not question the amount of 
money that Congress elected to spend. 
Alternatively, Congress could automatically enroll individuals in insurance 
as a default but allow them to opt out if they do not want coverage.258 Congress 
could also impose limited open-enrollment periods and penalties for late 
enrollment.259 Medicare uses some of these approaches.260 The context of private 
health insurance, however, is significantly different; it is uncertain whether 
these alternative methods would be nearly as effective in achieving high rates of 
enrollment as the minimum coverage provision.261 The answer would depend in 
part on the size of the exactions for going without insurance.262 Economist 
Jonathan Gruber of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology—a defender of 
the minimum coverage provision—examined auto-enrollment and late 
enrollment penalties, finding that “both alternatives significantly erode the 
gains in public health and insurance affordability made possible by the 
Affordable Care Act.”263 
However this forecasting debate turns out, there is little doubt that the 
minimum coverage provision satisfies the deferential McCulloch standard 
recently reaffirmed in Comstock.264 The provision would also likely survive a 
 
 257.  See, e.g., Chandra et al., supra note 226 (analyzing the approaches of mandates and subsidies 
and concluding that “the higher the subsidies, the smaller the role for an individual mandate”). 
 258.  See Jonathan Gruber, Health Care Reform Without the Individual Mandate: Replacing the 
Individual Mandate Would Significantly Erode Coverage Gains and Raise Premiums for Health Care 
Customers, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, 3–5 (Feb. 2011) http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/02/ 
pdf/gruber_mandate.pdf. 
 259.  See Herring, supra note 249; Gruber, supra note 258, at 5–7.  
 260.  Medicare Part B, which covers outpatient costs for individuals enrolled in Medicare, combines 
auto-enrollment with a late enrollment penalty of ten percent of premiums for each year of delay. See 
Herring, supra note 249; Gruber, supra note 258, at 5. Moreover, the Medicare Part D prescription drug 
plan imposes a penalty for late enrollment. See id. 
 261.  See Gruber, supra note 258, at 3–4 (discussing differences between the two settings, including 
the incentive of employers to encourage participation and the likelihood that young employees have 
already considered participation). 
 262.  For an analysis of the efficacy of individual mandates in various contexts, see generally Sherry 
A. Glied et al., Consider It Done? The Likely Efficacy of Mandates for Health Insurance, 26 HEALTH 
AFF. 1612 (2007). The authors find that the efficacy of an individual mandate turns on the cost of 
compliance, the exactions for noncompliance, and the extent to which compliance is enforced in a 
timely manner. Id. at 1613.  
 263.  Gruber, supra note 258, at 1. Specifically, Gruber found that “no alternative to the individual 
mandate can cover more than two-thirds as many uninsured as the Affordable Care Act does”; that “no 
alternative to the mandate saves much money”; and that “any alternative imposes much higher costs on 
those buying insurance in the new health insurance exchanges as the healthiest opt out and the less 
healthy face increased premiums.” Id. at 7. 
 264.  See supra note 255 (discussing the standard of review articulated by the Court in Comstock). 
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more demanding means–ends test, such as Justice Kennedy’s insistence on “a 
demonstrated link in fact, based on empirical demonstration.”265 
Critics of the provision also object that Congress may not invoke the 
Necessary and Proper Clause to cure an adverse-selection problem that 
Congress itself has largely created by using its commerce power. In the view of 
critics, Congress may not invoke the Sweeping Clause to justify legislation that 
ameliorates a problem of its own making. “[R]ather than being used to 
implement or facilitate enforcement of the Act’s insurance industry reforms,” 
the Florida district court wrote, “the individual mandate is actually being used 
as the means to avoid the adverse consequences of the Act itself.”266 The court 
reasoned that Congress may not use the Sweeping Clause this way because it 
“would have the perverse effect of enabling Congress to pass ill-conceived, or 
economically disruptive statutes, secure in the knowledge that the more 
dysfunctional the results of the statute are, the more essential or ‘necessary’ the 
statutory fix would be.”267 
Similarly, Randy Barnett cautions that Americans should “[l]ook at what is 
happening here. Congress exercises its commerce power to impose mandates on 
insurance companies, and then claims these insurance mandates will not have 
their desired effects unless it can impose mandates on the people—which would 
be unconstitutional if imposed on their own.”268 Barnett submits that “[b]y this 
reasoning, the Congress would now have the general police power the Supreme 
Court has always denied it possessed,” for “[a]ll Congress need do is adopt a 
broad regulatory scheme that won’t work the way Congress likes unless it can 
mandate any form of private conduct it wishes.”269 
The foregoing concerns about bootstrapping are problematic because it is 
often difficult to accomplish much good in the world without also doing some 
bad.270 Many actions have both desirable consequences and negative side effects, 
and the Court from McCulloch to Comstock has recognized this fact, allowing 
Congress to address both. (In this regard, federal laws are like many medical 
interventions.) If American constitutional law were otherwise, Comstock would 
have come out the other way, for the federal statute under review addressed a 
collective action problem caused in part by Congress when it authorized long 
periods of incarceration in remote federal prisons.271 If the law were otherwise, 
Congress would be precluded from banning the exclusionary practices of 
 
 265.  United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1967 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). 
 266.  Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1297 (N.D. 
Fla. 2011).  
 267.  Id. 
 268.  Hearing On The Constitutionality Of The Affordable Care Act Before the United States Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary (2011) (statement of Randy E. Barnett), available at 
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/11-02-02%20Barnett%20Testimony.pdf. 
 269.  Id. 
 270.  See Koppelman, supra note 191.  
 271.  See supra note 131–133, and accompanying text (discussing the multi-state collective action 
problem that Congress helped to create by severing state ties through long federal prison terms).  
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insurers unless it were willing to run the risk of destroying health insurance 
markets.272 
In any event, concerns about bootstrapping are beside the point in the 
context of healthcare reform. This is because the adverse-selection problem that 
undermines insurance markets long predates the ACA. Accordingly, the 
minimum coverage provision is justified by the Necessary and Proper Clause 
even without reference to the ACA’s prohibitions on underwriting. This is an 
underappreciated constitutional rationale for the provision. 
Although the bootstrapping objection is misguided, the concern animating 
it—fear of unlimited federal power—warrants consideration. The Supreme 
Court has addressed this concern by distinguishing economic subject matter 
from noneconomic subject matter. The theory of collective action federalism 
addresses this concern by distinguishing problems that require individual action 
by states from problems that require collective action. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
In at least two independently sufficient ways, the minimum coverage 
provision encounters no constitutional impediment sounding in federalism. It 
would be perplexing to conclude otherwise in light of the conceded 
constitutional validity of other potential approaches to healthcare reform. 
These alternatives include raising everyone’s taxes by the amount of the 
exaction for non-insurance in the ACA and then providing a federal tax credit 
only to insured individuals that equals the amount of this exaction. A 
requirement to obtain healthcare coverage or pay $X is materially equivalent to 
a requirement that only insured individuals need not pay $X in taxes.273  
Another concededly constitutional alternative to the ACA is more 
ambitious. Under longstanding Supreme Court precedent,274 Congress could 
pass a statute establishing “a government-run, ‘single-payer’ system such as 
Canada’s—the ‘Medicare for all’ approach advocated by many American 
liberals for years, but sharply opposed by insurers and many medical 
providers.”275 Instead of securing a much larger role for the federal government 
 
 272.  Or, as Andrew Koppelman has pointed out, Congress would be prohibited from criminalizing 
robbery of the mails because such a problem does not arise until Congress elects to establish a post 
office. Koppelman, supra note 191.  
 273.  For an analysis of the material equivalences between taxes and regulations backed by certain 
exactions, see generally Cooter & Siegel, supra note 69.  
 274.  See, e.g., Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (upholding the Social Security Act’s old-age 
pension program); see also Mark A. Hall, Health Care Reform—What Went Wrong on the Way to the 
Courthouse, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 295 (2011) (“Under long-established Supreme Court precedent, 
Congress would have authority, if it wanted, to enact a single-payer socialized insurance system, using 
its powers to tax and spend ‘for the general welfare.’”); Mariner & Annas, supra note 169, at 1301 
(“Other clearly constitutional approaches were available, including Medicare for All, or simply raising 
the income or payroll tax to pay for health benefits, but these would have been even more 
objectionable to those who are raising Commerce Clause problems with the ACA.”). 
 275.  LANDMARK, supra note 39, at 68.  
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in the interstate healthcare market,276 Congress passed the ACA, which “seeks 
to expand the number of people covered and begin the work of restraining costs 
by building on the existing structure of private insurance.”277 
The ACA, in other words, is a “market-based approach” that “bears clear 
resemblance to the leading Republican alternative to the Clinton plan, to 
proposals developed by the conservative Heritage Foundation, and to the 2006 
legislation signed by Republican Governor Mitt Romney that created universal 
coverage in Massachusetts.”278 If the constitutional concern raised by the 
minimum coverage provision is limitless federal power—a rationale for 
congressional authority that lacks “logical limitation”279—then it is puzzling why 
Congress may more completely displace the states (and more substantially 
restrict individual liberty) by authorizing a greater role for the federal 
government in regulating private conduct.280 
The solution to this puzzle is straightforward: Either making the financial 
decision to go without insurance qualifies as “activity,” as others have argued, 
or the constitutionality of the minimum coverage provision does not turn on 
whether Congress is regulating “inactivity,” as I have shown here. The 
inactivity–activity distinction does not even partially define the limits of the 
Commerce Clause. Rather, as identified by the theory of collective action 
federalism, a better constitutional distinction is between individual action and 
collective action by states. This is a structurally sound place to look for limits on 
the commerce power. 
The subject matter targeted by the minimum coverage provision is economic 
in nature. Moreover, Congress reasonably concluded that the provision 
addresses two collective action problems for the states: preventing cost shifting 
and guaranteeing access to health insurance while avoiding adverse selection. 
Accordingly, the minimum coverage provision is within the scope of the 
Commerce Clause, either alone or in combination with the Necessary and 
Proper Clause. 
 
 276.  See, e.g., Hall, supra note 274, at 295 (“Far short of [a single-payer socialized insurance 
system], the complex blend of regulation, subsidies, and an individual mandate included in the [ACA] 
is vastly more protective of insurance markets and individual freedoms.”).  
 277.  LANDMARK, supra note 39, at 68. 
 278.  Id.; see also id. at 6 (noting that President Nixon’s healthcare reform “architecture formed the 
basis for what Obama would pursue three decades later”); Hearing on the Constitutionality Of The 
Affordable Care Act Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary (2011) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, 
Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary), available at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/press_releases/ 
release/?id=debc354f-02d2-4d2b-b564-f4e372381147 (“Ironically, the so-called individual mandate now 
under partisan attack in the courts has long been a Republican proposal.”); cf. DAVID BLUMENTHAL & 
JAMES A. MORONE, THE HEART OF POWER: HEALTH AND POLITICS IN THE OVAL OFFICE vii (2010) 
(viewing Obama’s plan upon taking office as “well to the right of Nixon’s 1974 proposal”). 
 279.  See supra notes 78, 84, and accompanying text (quoting two district courts that have 
invalidated the minimum coverage provision). 
 280.  For an argument that the minimum coverage provision is compatible with a national 
government of limited and enumerated powers, see generally Neil S. Siegel, Four Constitutional Limits 
that the Minimum Coverage Provision Respects, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 591 (2011). 
